American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 17,
no. 1, February 2025
(pp. 206–37)
Abstract
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.Citation
Miettinen, Topi, and Christoph Vanberg. 2025. "Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 17 (1): 206–37. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230208Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F53 International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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