The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 15,
no. 3, August 2023
(pp. 305-53)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privatization in many autocracies. Calibrating to Russian and Chinese data, simulations to mid-twenty-first century display widening wealth gaps between elites and the populace. Anocracies mitigate this outcome.Citation
Cao, Dan, and Roger Lagunoff. 2023. "The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3): 305-53. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210229Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D31 Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K11 Property Law
- L33 Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P26 Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems; Property Rights
- P36 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
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