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  4. August 2022
  5. Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists

Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists

  • Emanuel Hansen
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14, no. 3, August 2022
(pp. 35-75)
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Abstract

This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.

Citation

Hansen, Emanuel. 2022. "Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (3): 35-75. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200041

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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