Orchestrating Information Acquisition
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 4, November 2021
(pp. 420-65)
Abstract
We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates ("types") about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential short-listing rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully sequential, at each round, the most efficient remaining bidder is admitted provided that her conditional expected contribution to the virtual surplus is positive.Citation
Lu, Jingfeng, Lixin Ye, and Xin Feng. 2021. "Orchestrating Information Acquisition." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (4): 420-65. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190114Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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