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Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

  • Umut Dur
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Fei Song
  • Tayfun Sönmez
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14, no. 1, February 2022
(pp. 164-85)
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism used nationwide for high school assignment starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score, with larger penalties for lower-ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid of the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless remains in use.

Citation

Dur, Umut, Parag A. Pathak, Fei Song, and Tayfun Sönmez. 2022. "Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (1): 164-85. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180386

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D47 Market Design
  • I21 Analysis of Education
  • I28 Education: Government Policy
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