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Information Design

  • Ina Taneva
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 11, no. 4, November 2019
(pp. 151-85)
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Abstract

A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal.

Citation

Taneva, Ina. 2019. "Information Design." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (4): 151-85. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170351

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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