This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy

  • Ravi Jagadeesan
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 11, no. 3, August 2019
(pp. 191-224)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer.

Citation

Jagadeesan, Ravi. 2019. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (3): 191-224. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170192

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
  • J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
  • J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment