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History-Bound Reelections

  • Hans Gersbach
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 12, no. 3, August 2020
(pp. 33-75)
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Abstract

We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a "score-replication rule." Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.

Citation

Gersbach, Hans. 2020. "History-Bound Reelections." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12 (3): 33-75. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170102

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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