Impressionable Voters
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 11,
no. 1, February 2019
(pp. 79-104)
Abstract
We propose a model of impressionable voters. Impressionable voters vote based on impressions rather than maximizing expected utility. We apply our model to elections with multiple candidates and solve for the stationary distributions of the implied stochastic process. In elections with two candidates, we find that impressionable voters select the candidate that maximizes utilitarian welfare. In multi-candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able to sufficiently distinguish competing candidates. In such cases, models with impressionable voters may have better normative properties than models with rational voters.Citation
Andonie, Costel, and Daniel Diermeier. 2019. "Impressionable Voters." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (1): 79-104. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160202Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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