A model of majority choice of voucher characteristics with quantitative counterpart explains observed income eligibility requirements for educational vouchers. Households differ by income and preference for religious schooling. They elect a policy maker who chooses public school expenditure, a voucher, a maximum income for voucher eligibility, and a tax to finance public expenditure. Equilibrium has a voucher below per student public expenditure, an eligibility threshold near 300 percent of the poverty level, and a majority in public school though with substantial voucher usage, all properties typical of U.S. voucher programs. Disallowing a voucher leads to higher per student public expenditure.
Epple, Dennis, Richard Romano, and Sinan Sarpça.
"Majority Choice of an Income-Targeted Educational Voucher."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Analysis of Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Education: Government Policy