Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure
- (pp. 132-80)
Abstract
We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.Citation
Levy, Nadav, Yossi Spiegel, and David Gilo. 2018. "Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure, and Foreclosure." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (1): 132-80. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160058Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
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