Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 10,
no. 3, August 2018
(pp. 143-76)
Abstract
This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the voters adopt reelection standards below what they receive in equilibrium. They therefore tend to be satisfied with the distributive politics of the incumbent politician. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes.Citation
Zudenkova, Galina. 2018. "Electoral Accountability and Interdistrict Competition." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (3): 143-76. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150307Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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