The Good Samaritan and Traffic on the Road to Jericho
- (pp. 33-53)
AbstractThis paper studies a version of the Volunteer's Dilemma in which players sequentially observe someone in trouble and decide whether to help. Where preferences are identical, we show that if the frequency with which potential helpers appear is above some threshold, then as frequency of appearance increases, the probability that any individual stops diminishes, but the expected waiting time for help to appear is constant. Where costs of stopping differ among individuals, as the frequency of appearance increases, the expected waiting time for help to appear decreases, even though the probability that any individual stops diminishes.
CitationBergstrom, Ted. 2017. "The Good Samaritan and Traffic on the Road to Jericho." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 33-53. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150296
- D62 Externalities
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- H41 Public Goods