Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 3, August 2015
(pp. 205-40)
Abstract
We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product investigated. (JEL D43, D86, K21, L12, L41)Citation
Marx, Leslie M., Claudio Mezzetti, and Robert C. Marshall. 2015. "Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (3): 205-40. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140054Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
- K21 Antitrust Law
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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