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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. February 2015
  5. Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences

Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences

  • Eric Danan
  • Thibault Gajdos
  • Jean-Marc Tallon
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7, no. 1, February 2015
(pp. 61-69)
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Abstract

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation. (JEL D01, D11, D71)

Citation

Danan, Eric, Thibault Gajdos, and Jean-Marc Tallon. 2015. "Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (1): 61-69. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130117

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D01 Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
  • D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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