Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8,
no. 2, May 2016
(pp. 61-85)
Abstract
We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates’ ideologies from observing candidates’ campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates’ types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects. (JEL D11, D72, D83)Citation
Agranov, Marina. 2016. "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (2): 61-85. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130036Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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