We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and
how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The
elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary
for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may
risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democracy
takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent
democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income
inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships
and show how the national defense role of the military may
facilitate democratic consolidation. (JEL D72, H56)
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni.
"A Theory of Military Dictatorships."
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
National Security and War