Selling Spectrum Rights
- (pp. 145-162)
AbstractThe design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?
CitationMcMillan, John. 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (3): 145-162. DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.3.145
- D44 Auctions
- L96 Telecommunications
- L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy