American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Crafting Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Patent Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 12,
no. 1, January 2020
(pp. 140–81)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We show that examiner-driven variation in patent rights leads to quantitatively large impacts on several patent outcomes, including patent value, citations, and litigation. Notably, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) overwhelmingly purchase patents granted by "lenient" examiners. These examiners issue patents that are more likely to be litigated by both PAEs and conventional companies, and that also have higher invalidity rates. PAEs leverage a specific friction in the patent system that stems from lenient examiners and affects litigation more broadly. These patterns indicate that there is much at stake during patent examination, contradicting the influential "rational ignorance" view of the patent office.Citation
Feng, Josh, and Xavier Jaravel. 2020. "Crafting Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Patent Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12 (1): 140–81. DOI: 10.1257/app.20180361Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- K11 Property Law
- K41 Litigation Process
- O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- O38 Technological Change: Government Policy