Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 12,
no. 2, April 2020
(pp. 67-95)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians.Citation
Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Marco Manacorda. 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12 (2): 67-95. DOI: 10.1257/app.20170778Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J23 Labor Demand
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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