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Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance

  • Filipe R. Campante
  • Quoc-Anh Do
  • Bernardo Guimaraes
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 11, no. 3, July 2019
(pp. 298-337)
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Abstract

We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

Citation

Campante, Filipe R., Quoc-Anh Do, and Bernardo Guimaraes. 2019. "Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11 (3): 298-337. DOI: 10.1257/app.20170111

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
  • O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
  • O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
  • R12 Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
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