Do electoral quotas for ethnic groups continue to improve their chances of winning elections after quotas are withdrawn? This is an important question since ethnic group quotas are common, and are often intended to be temporary. Using natural experiments, I find that electoral quotas for India's "scheduled castes" (SCs) fail to boost SCs' chances of winning office after they are discontinued. These results contrast with the significant positive effects of past women's quotas found in similar contexts.
"Do the Effects of Temporary Ethnic Group Quotas Persist? Evidence from India."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification