Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter. Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the fertility-sex ratio conflict.
"Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Demographic Economics: Public Policy
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration