Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility
- (pp. 256-60)
AbstractStructural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.
CitationFox, Jeremy T. 2017. "Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 256-60. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171114
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
- D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory