Direct Democracy and Public Employees
- (pp. 2227-46)
Abstract
In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)Citation
Matsusaka, John G. 2009. "Direct Democracy and Public Employees." American Economic Review, 99 (5): 2227-46. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2227Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
- J52 Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining