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  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2007
  5. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

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Abstract

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)

Citation

Roth, Alvin, E., Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver. 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences." American Economic Review, 97 (3): 828-851. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.3.828

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • I12 Health Production