Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons
- (pp. 1591-1620)
AbstractWe study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer's payoff shrinks to zero.
CitationGerardi, Dino, Lucas Maestri, and Ignacio Monzón. 2022. "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons." American Economic Review, 112 (5): 1591-1620. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201718
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility