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Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises

  • Marco Bassetto
  • Carlo Galli
American Economic Review
vol. 109, no. 10, October 2019
(pp. 3556-84)
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Abstract

We study the information sensitivity of government debt denominated in domestic versus foreign currency: the former is subject to inflation risk and the latter to default. Default only affects sophisticated bond traders, whereas inflation concerns a larger and less informed group. Within a two-period Bayesian trading game, differential information manifests itself in the secondary market, and we display conditions under which debt prices are more resilient to bad news even in the primary market, where only sophisticated players operate. Our results can explain debt prices across countries following the 2008 financial crisis, and also provide a theory of "original sin."

Citation

Bassetto, Marco, and Carlo Galli. 2019. "Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises." American Economic Review, 109 (10): 3556-84. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170721

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D84 Expectations; Speculations
  • F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
  • H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt