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The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation

  • Seunghoon Na
  • Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé
  • Martín Uribe
  • Vivian Yue
American Economic Review
vol. 108, no. 7, July 2018
(pp. 1773-1819)
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Abstract

A salient characteristic of sovereign defaults is that they are typically accompanied by large devaluations. This paper presents new evidence of this empirical regularity known as the Twin Ds and proposes a model that rationalizes it as an optimal policy outcome. The model combines limited enforcement of debt contracts and downward nominal wage rigidity. Under optimal policy, default is shown to occur during contractions. The role of default is to free up resources for domestic absorption, and the role of exchange rate devaluation is to lower the real value of wages, thereby reducing involuntary unemployment.

Citation

Na, Seunghoon, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Martín Uribe, and Vivian Yue. 2018. "The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation." American Economic Review, 108 (7): 1773-1819. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141558

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • E24 Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
  • E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
  • E52 Monetary Policy
  • F31 Foreign Exchange
  • F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
  • F41 Open Economy Macroeconomics