Aggregating Local Preferences to Guide Marginal Policy Adjustments
- (pp. 605-10)
AbstractWe propose a social choice rule for aggregating preferences elicited from surveys into a marginal adjustment of policy from the status quo. The mechanism is: (i) symmetric in its treatment of survey respondents; (ii) ordinal, using only the orientation of respondents' indifference surfaces; (iii) local, using only preferences in the neighborhood of current policy; and (iv) what we call "first-order strategy-proof," making the gains from misreporting preferences second order. The mechanism could be applied to guide policy based on how policy affects responses to subjective well-being surveys.
CitationBenjamin, Daniel J., Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Nichole Szembrot. 2013. "Aggregating Local Preferences to Guide Marginal Policy Adjustments." American Economic Review, 103 (3): 605-10. DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.605
- E61 Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- I31 General Welfare