Part D Formulary and Benefit Design as a Risk-Steering Mechanism
American Economic Review
vol. 101,
no. 3, May 2011
(pp. 382-86)
Abstract
Medicare Part D relies upon drug plan competition. Plans have enormous scope to design benefits and to set premiums, but they may not charge differential premiums based on risk. We use the formulary and benefit design of all Medicare prescription drug plans and pharmacy claims data to construct a simulation model of out-of-pocket drug spending. We use this simulation model to examine individual incentives in Medicare Part D for adverse selection. We find that high drug users have much stronger incentives to enroll in generous plans than do low users, thus there is significant scope for adverse selection.Citation
Goldman, Dana P., Geoffrey F. Joyce, and William B. Vogt. 2011. "Part D Formulary and Benefit Design as a Risk-Steering Mechanism." American Economic Review, 101 (3): 382-86. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.3.382JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J14 Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination