A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns
American Economic Review
vol. 100,
no. 3, June 2010
(pp. 1104-35)
Abstract
An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random "crackdowns," i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/ surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction. (JEL K42, R41)Citation
Eeckhout, Jan, Nicola Persico, and Petra E. Todd. 2010. "A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns." American Economic Review, 100 (3): 1104-35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- R41 Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise