Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment
American Economic Review
vol. 100,
no. 1, March 2010
(pp. 504-17)
Abstract
Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)Citation
Carpenter, Jeffrey, Peter Hans Matthews, and John Schirm. 2010. "Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment." American Economic Review, 100 (1): 504-17. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.504Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management