Supplemental Appendix

When Institutions Persist: Judicial Independence in an Unstable Political Order

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A. Variable Definitions, data information, and sources

Appendix A1. *Variable Definitions and Sources*

State Wins = The government victory variable is a binary indicator, with one representing a State victory and zero indicating a State defeat. Two independent teams of 5 attorneys each code this variable by examining judgment texts. 97% of the judgments received identical coding from both teams of attorneys. Legal professionals can partially access the text data via an online portal (https://www.pakistanlawsite.com/). We combine this with confidential text data retrieved from High Court case archives from the Registrar's Office. This allowed us to access and randomly sample the universe of High Court judgments. Additional information on the data construction can be found in Appendix A2.

Merit = This variable indicates whether a case was decided based on case merits or evidence rather than technical or procedural grounds. The two teams of attorneys also coded it at the case level. Specifically, it is a dummy variable that takes the value of one, indicating a case decided on case merits, and zero otherwise. This case-level variable was constructed similarly to the government victory variable based on the attorneys' reading of the text of judgment orders. Legal professionals can access the judgment text data through an online portal (https://www.pakistanlawsite.com/). This is supplemented by confidential text data retrieved from High Court case archives at the Registrar's Office, enabling us to access and randomly sample the universe of High Court judgments. Further details on data construction are available in Appendix A2.

Process Followed = This discrete variable rates the extent to which "all relevant jurisdictional, procedural, and evidential requirements were followed in reaching the judicial decision" on a scale from 1 to 5. A higher rating indicates that higher jurisdictional, procedural, and evidential standards were adhered to while making the judicial decision. The rating is also based on assessments made by attorneys, based on their review of the judgment order.

Same Law Firm Hire = This is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the new judicial hire had previously worked at the same law firm as one of the judges from the judge hiring panel's (previous) law firm. In other words, it indicates whether the newly appointed judge had prior employment at the same law firm as at least one of the judges on the committee responsible for appointing new judges. If the new judicial hire had such previous employment, the variable is coded as 1; otherwise, it takes the value of 0. This data is sourced from a combination of administrative records at the High Court registries and the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP). The independent variables turn on when committee appointees join the judge hiring panel.

Executive Appointed Vs. 1st Degree = This dummy variable transitions to a value of one when the first committee-appointed judge joins the judicial bench. The data for this variable is sourced from the Registrar's Offices of High Courts and the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan.

Executive Appointed Vs. 2nd Degree = This dummy variable switches to one on the arrival of the first judge at the judicial bench, shifts the composition of the judge hiring panel to a majority of committee-appointed judges. This data is sourced from the Registrar's Office of High Courts and the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan.

Committee Appointees Majority 4-3 = This binary variable activates when a judge's arrival shifts the judge-hiring panel to a majority of committee-appointed judges compared to executive-appointed judges. It turns to one when the arrival of the new judge shifts the judge hiring panel to a 4:3 majority within the 7-panel judge hiring committee. Figure 1 visually depicts the judge hiring authority's evolution in selecting first and second-generation committee appointees. The data is compiled from High Court and Supreme Court registries in Pakistan.

Elite Law School = This binary variable takes the value of 1 if the judge was educated at one of Pakistan's top 10 law universities and zero otherwise. The ranking is taken from a global ranking of top law schools worldwide, and we particularly retrieve the "Best Law Schools in Pakistan". For a complete list and methodology behind the rankings, see https://bestlawschools.net/top-law-schools-in-pakistan/

Left-Party or Progressive Group Lawyers = This is a dummy variable that switches on if the judge had previously run bar elections on the Progressive Group party ticket and zero otherwise. The progressive group acts as a union of lawyers and prioritizes principles of social justice, human rights principles, and legal reforms, such as greater representation of women and minorities at the bar and the bench. Data for this is primarily sourced from bar association records and judicial gazettes of the High Courts.

Right-Party or Professional Group Lawyers = This dummy variable depends on whether the judge had previously run bar elections on the Professional Group party ticket. The professional group runs for bar unions on the principles of greater focus on the interests of lawyers and businesses and calls for a reduction in regulation and more business-friendly reforms. Data is also sourced from bar association records and judicial gazettes.

Number of Lawyers = A count variable for the number of lawyers arguing the particular case. This case-level variable is also retrieved from information in judgment texts. Two teams of 5 attorneys independently code this variable by examining judgment texts, and there is 100% agreement in coding for the number of attorneys between both teams.

Number of Judges = A count variable for the number of judges adjudicating a particular case. This case-level variable is also retrieved from judgment texts. Two teams of five attorneys each code this variable by analyzing judgment texts. Both teams provided identical coding for the number of judges in 100% of the judgments.

Bench Chief Justice = A dummy variable for the High Court Chief Justice adjudicating in a particular case. This case-level variable is also retrieved from judgment texts. Two teams of 5 attorneys independently code this variable by examining judgment texts, with 100% agreement on whether the case involved the Chief Justice.

Criminal Case Type = A dummy for criminal cases, as indicated in the text of the judgment order. This case-level variable is also retrieved from judgment texts. Two teams of 5 attorneys also code this variable in judgment texts independently, achieving 100% agreement.

Constitutional Case = A dummy for constitutional cases, as indicated in the text of the judgment order. This case-level variable is also retrieved from judgment texts. The same two teams of 5 attorneys also independently code this variable from judgment texts with perfect agreement.

Gender = This variable is a dummy for male judges and was coded in two ways. Firstly, the authors manually checked every judge's name. Secondly, we used Stata to read the strings from administrative data on judge full names starting with "Justice Miss" and "Justice Mrs." as zero (indicating female judges) and the string starting with "Justice Mr." as one (indicating male judges). Both methods yielded an identical number of male and female justices.

Elevated to SC = This dummy variable denotes whether a judge ascended to the Supreme Court, turning on if the High Court judge was promoted and remaining zero otherwise. The information is retrieved from administrative data maintained at the Supreme Court of Pakistan and accessible in the Judicial Gazettes of Pakistan.

Former Lawyer = This dummy variable indicates whether the High Court justice was an attorney, typically true unless they were a former lower court judge. Data sources to construct this variable include annual reports, Bar Council records, and judicial administrative data at High Courts' Registrar offices.

Former Office Holder Bar Association = A dummy variable indicates whether the judge held the position of secretary-general or president in the lawyers' bar association before becoming a High Court judge. Data is sourced from biographical information on bar association websites, offices, and judicial administrative records at High Courts' Registrar Offices.

Former Judge = A dummy variable indicates whether the judge had prior service as a lower court judge (civil, session, or additional session judge). Data sources to construct this variable include biographical information from annual reports submitted to High Courts, Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan Reports, and judicial administrative records at High Courts' Registrar Offices.

Appendix A2. *Data Construction and Sources*

We randomly sample 20,000 High Court cases in Pakistan from the years 1986 to 2022, constituting 0.3% of the total available cases involving the State. Figure B1 in Appendix B illustrates the evolving nature of the random sample relative to the total universe of cases every year. With the exception of a decline in case filings during the COVID-19 lockdown, there is an observable gradual increase in case filings each year. To be included in our sample, a prerequisite was that the government was one of the parties in the case. The data recorded in the judgment order texts was coded by two teams, each comprising four lawyers under the supervision of a senior attorney (two teams of 5's). Notably, 97% of the judgments share identical coding between both attorney teams, ensuring consistent results regardless of the specific team's coding used. The data was acquired through a contractual agreement with a reputable law firm. The data acquisition involved accessing information from the Pakistan law site portal and utilizing the provided data from the High Court registry. The task assigned to the firm was to code the variables outlined in the preceding section based on their analysis of judgment texts in a team of two, with five legal experts each. Part of this data is available partially online at https://www.pakistanlawsite.com/. The website serves as a central repository of cases and is commonly used by lawyers in Pakistan for case preparation for those "Approved for Reporting" by judges. It is a password-protected site accessed through a law firm and is considered a "Central Library" for lawyers practicing within Pakistan's (Common) Law system, where case precedent is highly valued. To ensure a more representative sample, we supplemented the online data with archival data from the High Court's Registrar's Offices and record rooms of the High Courts. These archives provide access to cases that may not have been "approved for reporting" by the judges. This confidential judgment text data ensures we have a representative sample. Specifically, the task of recording key information from the judgment texts was carried out by two independent teams of four lawyers each, supervised by a senior lawyer (team of 5). A formal contract was in place to ensure the independence of the teams, and random field visits were conducted to verify compliance with the agreement. The two senior lawyers supervising the teams were experts in constitutional law, with over 10 and 12 years of experience as practicing attorneys at the High Court. Their expertise made them well-suited to oversee the coding process, especially for cases involving the state. The remaining eight individuals involved in the coding exercise were legal experts who had all passed the "L.L.M" (called L.L.B in Pakistan) examination, which is equivalent to a two-year master's degree in law. This qualification is a prerequisite for practicing law as an attorney in Pakistan. These coders were essentially junior attorneys at the law firm, and they were not provided with any information about the research question. Implementing this data collection approach, with coding conducted by two independent teams, initially introduced by Djankov et al. (2003) and influencing a body of literature (see, e.g., Epstein and Segal, 2000; Choi et al., 2010; Aney et al., 2021), ensures the reliability of the coded information for our research study. The dataset on judicial appointments, retirements,

affiliations with law firms, and promotions data is curated from diverse sources, encompassing High Court registries, bar association records, Judicial Gazettes of Pakistan, and confidential but mandatory reports submitted to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP) by each regional High Court. These data combine to delineate judges' past, present, and anticipated career paths, enabling the construction of a network of judicial elites and tracing of judges' entire trajectories, encompassing their journeys from law schools they attended, affiliations with law firms when they were attorneys, to their elevation to judgeships.

Appendix A3. *Pakistan's Court System*

This section provides an overview of the structure and background of the courts in Pakistan. The foundation for the current High Courts in India and Pakistan can be traced back to the Indian High Courts Act of 1861, which granted the British Crown the authority to establish High Courts in the Indian colony. After gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1947, both India and Pakistan introduced various modifications to their legal institutions while maintaining the overall institutional structure, including Common Law jurisprudence, civil and criminal procedures, and the three-tier system of Trial, High, and Supreme Courts. One notable change was the increase in the mandatory retirement age for High Court judges from 60 to 62. India raised the retirement age in 1963, followed by Pakistan in 1969 through constitutional amendments, and it has remained at 62 ever since.


While our study focuses on the Pakistani High Court, it is essential to note that Pakistan's judiciary operates under a three-tier hierarchical system. At the lowest level, there are civil and criminal courts that handle civil and criminal cases. The High Courts have the authority to review decisions made by these lower courts. In cases involving government, for instance, land expropriation or violations of fundamental rights, the High Court is often the primary and sometimes the only recourse for individuals and firms seeking redress. Cases are assigned to judges within the High Court through a case management system. Although there are only four provincial High Courts and one federal High Court in Islamabad, the High Court system is dispersed across the provinces through 16 regional High Courts or "divisional" benches. Each region has about four judicial benches specializing in property, writ or human rights, tax, and criminal cases. Hence, there are 64 judicial benches across Pakistan according to these four specializations. It is worth noting that Pakistani laws and capacity constraints impose limitations on replacing judicial vacancies at the bench level. In most cases, replacements are determined by mandatory retirements (for more details, see Mehmood, 2022).

High Courts hold significant importance in Pakistan as they provide a platform for individuals to file cases against the government, including constitutional petitions (writ petitions) or criminal appeals, with the State being a party. Constitutional cases involving the State can be filed against the federal, provincial, or local governments or any organ of the state that holds executive authority, such

as the office of the Prime Minister. Finally, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, located in the federal capital of Islamabad, serves as the final appellate court. It hears appeals on "technical" grounds for criminal and constitutional cases from the High Courts. The Supreme Court has a minimal number of judges (a maximum of 17), which restricts the number and scope of cases it can hear. As a result, only a tiny proportion of cases are heard by the Supreme Court.

B. Appendix Figures and Tables


Figure B1: Total Cases Versus Sampled Cases




Note: The figure shows 20,000 cases randomly sampled between 1986 and 2022 from the High Courts of Pakistan. The sampled cases represent about 0.3% of the cases decided during this period. To be included in the sample, the case must involve the state as one of the parties, with the State typically acting as a respondent to a citizen's claim.

Figure B2: Distribution of Main Outcome Variables

Panel A: State Wins




Panel B: Same Law Firm



Note: Panel A displays the estimated probability density of the primary outcome variable, State Wins, with a mean of 0.43 and a standard deviation of 0.50. Panel B shows the distribution of Same Law Firm, defined as the share of judges on a bench who previously worked at the same law firm as a committee member. The mean is 0.48, with a standard deviation of 0.21.


Figure B3: Illustration of Same Law Firm Judges




Note: The figure provides examples of judges in Pakistani courts who were affiliated with the same law firms prior to their appointments. For instance, Justice Ayesha Malik and Justice Umar Ata Bandial were both associated with Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim & Co. before their elevation to the bench. Justice Ayesha Malik was appointed after the committee selection reform in 2010, while Justice Umar Ata Bandial served on the judicial appointment panel. The authors emphasize that, although the example in this figure is based on factual information, it is presented for data visualization purposes and is intended to illustrate a general pattern.

Figure B4: Effect on State Wins: 1st- vs. 2nd-Degree Committee Judges Relative to Presidential Appointees

Panel A: Government Victories




Panel B: Same-Law-Firm Hires




Note: The figure presents event-study estimates of the effect of committee-appointed judges, relative to presidential appointees, on state wins (Panel A) and same-law-firm hires (Panel B). Circles denote first-degree committee appointees, and triangles denote second-degree committee appointees. Each series is centered on the first appointment of that type at the bench, so T need not correspond to the same calendar year across the series. All specifications are estimated using case-level data with bench and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bench level. Vertical bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.

Figure B5: Robustness to Heterogeneous Treatment Timing and Alternative Estimators

Panel A: Effect on Government Victories Over Time




Panel B: Effect on Same-Firm Hires Over Time




Note: The figure presents event-study estimates for State Wins (Panel A) and Same Law Firm hires (Panel B), based on Equation (2) and alternative estimators designed for staggered treatment timing. Alongside the baseline two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specification, we report estimates from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess (2021), and Sun and Abraham (2021). The treatment is defined as the arrival of second-generation committee-appointed judges, triggered when committee members form a majority on the judicial appointment panel. The control group consists of first-generation appointees; executive-appointed judges are excluded. The omitted category is the year prior to the first second-generation appointment. Standard errors are clustered at the court-by-bench level; 95 percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure B6: Decision Quality Over Time—Alternative Estimators and Staggered Treatment

Panel A: Dynamic Effect on Case Merits Over Time




Panel B: Dynamic Effect on Process Followed




Note: The figure presents event-study estimates for merit-based rulings (Panel A) and due process adherence (Panel B), based on Equation (2) and alternative estimators designed for staggered treatment timing. Alongside the baseline two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specification, we report estimates from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess (2021), and Sun and Abraham (2021). The treatment is defined as the arrival of second-generation committee-appointed judges, triggered when committee members form a majority on the judicial bench. The comparison group consists of first-generation committee appointees; executive-appointed judges are excluded. The omitted category is the year prior to the first second-generation appointment. The sample is restricted to four years before and after treatment to ensure estimator precision. Standard errors are clustered at the court-by-bench level; 95 percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure B7: Number of Constitutional Cases by Judge

Panel A: Constitutional Petitions




Panel B: Criminal Appeals




Note: The figure shows the distribution of constitutional (Panel A) and criminal (Panel B) cases across the 734 judges in our sample. Judges are anonymized and indexed along the X-axis; the Y-axis reports the number of cases handled. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure B8: Evolution of New Appointments and Mandatory Retirements




Note: The figure presents the correlation between mandatory retirements and the arrival of first-generation committee-appointed judges, highlighting how retirements generate vacancies subsequently filled through new appointments. The plot tracks the evolution of retirements and appointments across 64 benches in 16 divisional High Courts, before and after the 2010 judicial selection reform. The patterns reveal a strong alignment between retirements and new appointments. The correlation coefficient is 0.99, with a p-value < 0.01.

Figure B9: Herfindahl Index of Same Law Firms' Concentration




Note: The bars report the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), measuring the concentration of judges previously affiliated with the same law firm as at least one member of the judicial appointment panel. Higher values reflect greater concentration in hiring from a narrow set of firms; lower values indicate more diversity. The index ranges from 0 to 10,000, with values below 1,000 considered unconcentrated, 1,500–2,500 moderately concentrated, and above 2,500 highly concentrated, following U.S. Department of Justice and FTC Guidelines (§5.3, 2010).

Figure B10: Age Decision and State Wins



Note: The figure plots pro-government rulings across judge age brackets during their tenure. High Court judges are required to be at least 40 years old at appointment and must retire at age 62. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure B11: Confidence Interval by Wild Bootstrap



Note: The figure displays estimated distributions around our coefficients of interest using wild bootstrap clustering, as per Cameron et al. (2008), which imposes a small cluster correction. Roodman et al. (2019)'s *bootest* in Stata 18 is used to construct this confidence interval with 999 repetitions. Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild bootstrapping procedure utilizes the Rademacher distribution with the null hypothesis imposed. It involves converting the t-statistic from the Wald test and inverting the test to compute the bounds of the confidence set under the imposed number of clusters (in our case, 64 judicial benches). The resulting "confidence curve" is plotted, providing the bootstrapped p-values that represent the limits of the confidence set. Here a more aggregated clustering structure at the level of Pakistan's 16 administrative divisions or regions is implemented.

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Panel A: *Case Characteristics (varies by case)*					
State Wins	18854	0.441	0.496	0	1
Merit	18854	0.663	0.473	0	1
Process Followed	18854	3.426	1.511	1	5
Executive vs. 1st degree	18854	0.203	0.402	0	1
Executive vs. 2nd degree	18854	0.086	0.281	0	1
Constitutional	18854	0.624	0.484	0	1
Criminal	18854	0.366	0.482	0	1
Land case	18854	0.364	0.481	0	1
Chief Justice on Bench	18854	0.063	0.243	0	1
Number of lawyers	18854	4.133	1.777	2	32
Number of judges	18854	1.805	0.832	1	5
Panel B: *Appointment and Retirement in the transition year (by court-bench)*					
Executive Vs. 1st degree	64	0.203	0.150	0	0.476
Executive Vs. 2nd degree	64	0.095	0.085	0	0.360
Panel C: *Judge Characteristics (by judges)*					
Tenure at Decision	734	3.609	2.986	0	22
Gender	734	0.952	0.213	0	1
Former LowerCourt Judge	734	0.110	0.314	0	1
Office Holder Bar Asso.	734	0.541	0.499	0	1
Former Lawyer	734	0.883	0.322	0	1
Majority ethnicity	734	0.268	0.443	0	1
Minority ethnicity	734	0.056	0.230	0	1
Promoted to Supreme Court	734	0.026	0.159	0	1
Same Law Firm	734	0.536	0.226	0	1
Executive Appointed judges	734	0.403	0.491	0	1
1st degree judges	734	0.223	0.417	0	1
2nd degree judges	734	0.373	0.484	0	1

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the baseline sample of 18,854 cases heard by 734 judges across 64 judicial benches within 16 divisional benches of the High Courts of Pakistan. The sample covers the period from 1986 to 2022.

Table B2: Treatment, Case Composition, and Bench Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Constitutional	Criminal	Land Case	Bench Chief Justice	No. of Lawyer	No. of Judge	Total Judges Bench	Avg Case on s Bench	Executive Vs 1st Deg	Executive Vs 2nd Deg
Executive Vs 1st degree	-0.00787	0.00189	-0.0176	0.00860	0.119	0.0497	0.119	0.207		
	[0.00839]	[0.00213]	[0.0165]	[0.0109]	[0.0764]	[0.0440]	[0.260]	[0.266]		
Executive Vs 2nd degree	-0.00227	-0.00259	0.0228	0.0147	0.115	0.0972*	-0.388*	0.258		
	[0.0288]	[0.00492]	[0.0217]	[0.0164]	[0.0997]	[0.0497]	[0.212]	[0.256]		
Constitutional									-0.0225	-0.00383
									[0.0331]	[0.0685]
Criminal									-0.0229	-0.00309
									[0.0332]	[0.0658]
Land Case									-0.00620	0.00385
									[0.00513]	[0.00399]
Bench Chief Justice									0.00579	0.00648
									[0.00842]	[0.00743]
No of Lawyer									0.00155	0.000572
									[0.00110]	[0.000816]
No of judge									0.00271	0.00351
									[0.00317]	[0.00212]
Total Judges Bench									0.0200	-0.0267
									[0.0344]	[0.0174]
Avg cases Bench									0.00306	0.00155
									[0.00446]	[0.00253]
District by Bench & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench Trends & Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	0.510	0.603	1.024	0.525	1.501	2.550	2.004	0.880	1.232	1.232
p-values	0.603	0.550	0.365	0.594	0.231	0.0861	0.143	0.420	0.295	0.487
R-squared	0.745	0.771	0.288	0.037	0.019	0.075	0.966	0.610	0.720	0.668
Mean	0.624	0.366	0.364	0.0628	4.133	1.805	7.901	3.398	0.203	0.0863
Observations	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854

Note: This table reports estimates from Equation (1), examining how judicial selection is correlated with case composition and judge characteristics across benches. Specifically, the table provides coefficient estimates of equation (1), treating case characteristics as dependent variables (excluding one control variable that becomes the dependent variable). The dependent variables include the number of constitutional cases filed (Column 1), the number of criminal cases filed (Column 2), the number of defense-filed land cases (Column 3), a dummy variable indicating the presence of the chief justice among the adjudicating judges (Column 4), the total number of lawyers (defense and prosecution combined) (Column 5), the number of judges adjudicating the case (Column 6), the total number of judges on the bench (Column 7), and the average number of cases on a bench (Column 8). Column 9 presents the joint effect of all case characteristics on Executive Vs. 1st Degree (1st generation judges), while Column 10 presents the joint effect on Executive vs. 2nd Degree (2nd generation judges) as suggested in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B3: Causal Mediation Analysis with First-Generation versus Second-Generation Committee Appointees

	(1) Elite Law School	(2) Age at Appointment	(3) Judge Tenure	(4) Male	(5) Former Office Holder Bar Association	(6) Prior Political Office	(7) Elevated To the Supreme Court
Panel A: 1st Degree Vs. 2nd Degree							
Natural Indirect Effect (NIE)	-0.030 [0.019]	-0.007 [0.010]	-0.004* [0.002]	0.001 [0.001]	-0.000 [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.003 [0.004]
Natural Direct Effect (NDE)	-0.121*** [0.024]	-0.147*** [0.017]	-0.128*** [0.018]	-0.132*** [0.018]	-0.131*** [0.018]	-0.129*** [0.018]	-0.133*** [0.018]
Total Effect (TE)	-0.151*** [0.014]	-0.154*** [0.014]	-0.131*** [0.018]	-0.131*** [0.018]	-0.131*** [0.018]	-0.130*** [0.018]	-0.130*** [0.018]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District by bench FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574
Panel B: Fraction Explained by Mediator							
1st Degree Vs. 2nd Degree							
Percentage of Effect Explained by the Mediating Variable	0.201 [0.127]	0.045 [0.066]	0.028 [0.017]	-0.007 [0.007]	0.001 [0.005]	0.006 [0.005]	-0.020 [0.029]
Observations	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574	4,574

Note: The table presents a causal mediation analysis with "1st Degree Judge vs. 2nd Degree Judge" as the treatment and "State Wins" as the outcome variable. In Panel A, the total effect is decomposed into two distinct components: the Natural Indirect Effect (NIE), which represents the mediation effect, and the Natural Direct Effect (NDE), which signifies the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable that is not through the mediator. The 1st Degree vs 2nd Degree Judge is a dummy variable that switches to one for cases involving second-generation judges and is zero for first-generation judges. A comparison is made between 1st Generation judges, predominantly selected by an executive-appointed judge hiring panel in the majority, and 2nd Generation Judges, selected by committee-appointed judges' hiring panel in the majority. Executive-appointed judges are excluded from this comparison, focusing on the reform multiplier effect. Each column corresponds to a different dependent variable. Panel B presents causal mediation estimates for the characteristics listed in Panel A, assessing their role in mediating the relationship between second-generation appointments and pro-government rulings. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges on the bench. The baseline equation with court-by-bench or district-by-bench fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends and controls are included in all columns. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B4: Reform Persistence, Corporate Capture and Military Linked Firms

	Excluding Small and Medium-Sized Firms		*Excluding Large Firms*		*Excluding Military Linked Firms*	
	State Wins					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Executive Vs. 1st Degree	-0.0764**	-0.0807**	-0.0724*	-0.0810**	-0.0751*	-0.0815**
	[0.0368]	[0.0372]	[0.0389]	[0.0390]	[0.0379]	[0.0383]
Executive Vs. 2nd Degree	-0.263***	-0.254***	-0.232***	-0.237***	-0.244***	-0.245***
	[0.0569]	[0.0574]	[0.0582]	[0.0596]	[0.0574]	[0.0593]
Court by bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Specialization bench linear trends	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
F-statistic	12.76	6.753	9.546	5.380	10.65	5.530
P-Value (1st Deg = 2nd Deg)	0.0075	0.0123	0.0245	0.0298	0.0149	0.0216
R-squared	0.151	0.169	0.159	0.175	0.157	0.172
Mean	0.442	0.442	0.436	0.436	0.437	0.437
Observations	17,854	17,854	18,226	18,226	18,684	18,496

Note: This table provides the coefficient estimates for first and second-generation committee appointees on government victories. We sequentially exclude cases involving small firms, large firms, and military-linked firms, conducting a series of sample-restricted analyses. Specifically, it provides estimates of coefficients α and β from Equation (1), with the dependent variable being State Wins. The analysis focuses on three subsets of cases: those involving the State versus large firms, defined as the top 35 conglomerates in Pakistan according to the list outlined in Malik (2022), military firms, and those involving the State versus small or medium-sized firms, where the remaining firms in our sample are considered small or medium-sized enterprises. Executive Appointment Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first committee-appointed judge at the bench (one degree of separation from the Executive Appointments). The Executive Appointment Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive Appointments). It switches on when the first second-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions by committee appointees is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case-level controls and judge-level controls (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of the chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges on the bench. The estimates from the baseline equation (1) with District by Year fixed effects, Case Controls, Judge and Bench Controls, and bench-specific linear trends in columns 2, 4 and 6 , court by bench and year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in all Columns. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B5: Reform Persistence and Al-Jehad Trust Case

	State Wins		*Same Law Firm Hire*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Executive Appointments Vs. 1st Degree	-0.0830**	-0.0773**	0.0648*	0.0683*
	[0.0376]	[0.0377]	[0.0361]	[0.0361]
Executive Appointments Vs. 2nd Degree	-0.265***	-0.250***	0.196***	0.199***
	[0.0564]	[0.0589]	[0.0354]	[0.0421]
Court-by-Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls & Court-by-Bench Linear Trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
F-Statistics (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	13.21	5.107	15.35	4.406
P-Value (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	0.00818	0.0153	0.00407	0.0103
R-squared	0.175	0.189	0.790	0.806
Mean of dependent variable	0.422	0.422	0.302	0.302
Observations	15,188	15,188	15,188	15,188

Note: The table displays the estimated reform multiplier effect on the likelihood of government victories from 1996 to 2022. Coefficients α and β are estimated from equation (1), with the state victory as the dependent dummy variable, coded as one for cases adjudicated in the state's favor and zero otherwise in column (1) and column (2). Same law firm hire in the dependent variable for column (3) and column(4). It is the share of judges in a district bench that were former colleagues with at least 1 member of the committee. Executive Appointment Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first committee-appointed judge at the bench (one degree of separation from the Executive Appointments). The Executive Appointment Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive Appointments). Specifically, the variable switches on when the first second-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench. The comparison of judicial decisions by committee appointees is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive branch in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges on the bench. The estimates from the baseline equation (1) with court-by-bench or district-by-bench fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in Column 4. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B6: Reform Persistence and Judge Ideology

	State Wins			
	Left Party Bar Ticket (Progressives' Group)		Right Party Bar Ticket (Professionals' Group)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Executive Vs 1st Degree	-0.0552	-0.0735	-0.0662	-0.0442
	[0.0412]	[0.0467]	[0.0505]	[0.0547]
Executive Vs 2nd Degree	-0.198**	-0.173*	-0.272***	-0.280***
	[0.0796]	[0.0917]	[0.0711]	[0.0698]
Court-by-Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Court-by-Bench Linear Trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
F-stat (1st Deg = 2nd Deg)	3.496	3.941	9.766	3.891
Pval (1st Deg = 2nd Deg)	0.0894	0.305	0.0356	0.0128
R-squared	0.156	0.184	0.211	0.250
Mean of dep variable	0.466	0.466	0.428	0.428
Observations	5,616	5,616	4,588	4,588

Note: In this table, we delve into the reform multiplier effect on government victories in cases, distinguishing between two groups of judges based on their prior affiliation in bar elections. The analysis focuses on the two major factions that engage in bar elections. The initial two columns present cases associated with judges on the left-leaning bar ticket, identified by a dummy variable reflecting their alignment with a liberal or left-leaning party in bar association elections (called the "*Progressive Group of Lawyers*"). The subsequent columns highlight cases involving judges on the right-leaning bar ticket, identified by a dummy variable indicating their affiliation with the right-leaning "*Professionals Group*." The regression reports coefficient estimates (α and β) from equation (1), with the state victory variable as the dependent variable—a dummy variable denoting whether a case favored the state (1) or not (0). Executive Appointment Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first committee-appointed judge at the bench (one degree of separation from the Executive Appointments). The Executive Appointment Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive Appointments). Specifically, the variable switches on when the first second-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench. The comparison of judicial decisions by committee appointees is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges on the bench. The estimates from the baseline equation (1) with court-by-bench or district-by-bench fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in Columns 2 and 4. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B7: Impact on Prosecution and Defense Effort

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	# Defense Lawyers	# Prosecution Lawyers	# Cases filed by Defense	# Cases filed by Prosecution	State Wins at Judge Level (without and with Controls)	
Executive Vs. 1st Degree	0.0755	0.0965*	948.7**	1,084**	-0.224***	-0.164***
	[0.0573]	[0.0483]	[464.4]	[444.6]	[0.0467]	[0.0564]
Executive Vs. 2nd Degree	-0.0389	0.0230	941.9	1,673	-0.318***	-0.295***
	[0.0693]	[0.0692]	[746.0]	[1,052]	[0.0436]	[0.0439]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Court-by-Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	NA
Court-by-Bench Linear Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	NA
Level of Variation in Dep. Var.	case-level	case-level	case-level	case-level	judge-level	judge-level
F-Statistics (1st Deg. = 2nd Deg.)	78.84	77.64	1.355	0.950	27.25	30.43
P -Value (1st Deg. = 2nd Deg.)	0.202	0.385	0.993	0.562	0.0360	0.0112
R-squared	0.432	0.407	0.886	0.900	0.086	0.122
Mean of dependent variable	2.086	2.070	6330	8706	0.343	0.343
Observations	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854	734	734

Note: This table provides the coefficient estimates for first and second-generation committee appointees. Columns 1 to 4 focus on the efforts of defense and prosecution and run regression at our baseline case level, while Columns 5 and 6 focus on a balance check and run judge-level regression. Specifically, it presents the estimates of coefficients α and β from equation (1), with the number of defense lawyers in Column (1), the number of prosecution lawyers on the case in Column (2), the number of cases filed by the defense in the judicial bench for the year the case was decided in Column (3), and the number of cases filed by the prosecution in the bench for that year in Column (4). Columns (5) and (6) investigate the stability of our regression at the judge level, which, under the random assignment of judges to cases, speaks to concerns raised by Klein and Priest (1984). Executive Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first-generation appointed judge at the bench (one degree of separation from the Executive appointments). The Executive Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive appointments). It switches on when the first 2nd-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges in a bench. The specification from the baseline equation (1) with district-bench or court-bench, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in all columns when applicable. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B8: Cases with Judges Sharing Law Firm Backgrounds with Attorneys

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	State Wins	Case Merit	Process Followed
Executive Vs. 1st Degree	-0.329**	0.0900	0.437
	[0.156]	[0.162]	[0.410]
Executive Vs. 2nd Degree	-0.511***	0.359**	0.692**
	[0.133]	[0.141]	[0.293]
Bench & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench Specialized Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistics (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	3.689	2.284	3.324
P -Value (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	0.0747	0.00678	0.416
R-squared	0.689	0.653	0.582
Mean	0.441	0.916	4.489
Observations	1,019	1,019	1,019

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the reform multiplier effect on government victories in a subsample of cases where the attorneys' law firm coincides with the judges' former law firm. Specifically, it details the estimates of coefficients α and β from equation (1), using the state victory variable as the dependent variable—a dummy that assumes a value of one when the state wins the case and zero otherwise. Executive Appointment Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first committee-appointed judge at the bench (one degree of separation from the Executive Appointments). The Executive Appointment Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive Appointments). It switches on when the first second-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions by committee appointees is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges on the bench. The estimates from the baseline equation (1) with court-by-bench or district-by-bench fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in all columns. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B9: Controlling for Baseline Judge and Case Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	State Wins			
Executive Vs 1st Degree	-0.0815**	-0.0782**	-0.0765**	-0.102**
	[0.0378]	[0.0367]	[0.0366]	[0.0423]
Executive Vs 2nd Degree	-0.255***	-0.258***	-0.259***	-0.216***
	[0.0585]	[0.0581]	[0.0580]	[0.0638]
Baseline Case Characteristics by Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Judge Characteristics by Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
District by Year FE	No	No	No	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Court by Bench FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench Specific Linear trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistics (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	6.386	6.879	12.58	9.110
P -Value (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	p-value =0.014	p-value <0.01	p-value <0.01	p-value <0.01
R-squared	0.167	0.181	0.185	0.259
Mean	0.441	0.441	0.441	0.441
Observations	18,854	18,854	18,854	18,854

Note: This table explores the reform multiplier effect on government victories, incorporating State-Year Fixed Effects, Time Interactions, and Baseline Characteristics. Specifically, the table presents estimates of coefficients α and β from equation (1), where the dependent variable is the state victory variable—a dummy that is assigned a value of one if the case is ruled in favor of the state and zero otherwise. Executive Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first-generation appointed judge at the district bench (one degree of separation from the Executive appointees). The Executive Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the second-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive appointees). It switches on when the first 2nd-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the district bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges in a bench.The estimates from the baseline equation (1) with court-bench, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends are reported in Column (1). Additional fixed effects and interactive effects are included in the subsequent columns, with Column (4) also incorporating district-by-year fixed effects and an extensive list of interactive time-fixed effects alongside all available observed case and judge characteristics. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B10: Robustness via Exclusion of Judicial Benches

	State Wins			
	Without Criminal Benches	Without Property Benches	Without Tax Benches	Without Writ Benches
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Executive Vs 1st Degree	-0.0945**	-0.0957**	-0.0533	-0.0778*
	[0.0445]	[0.0444]	[0.0404]	[0.0455]
Executive Vs 2nd Degree	-0.247***	-0.260***	-0.254***	-0.258***
	[0.0676]	[0.0728]	[0.0619]	[0.0640]
Court-by-Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Court-by-Bench Linear Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistics (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	5.950	4.018	8.252	4.962
P -Value (1st Degree = 2nd Degree)	0.0603	0.0687	p-value <0.01	0.0211
R-squared	0.161	0.171	0.166	0.174
Mean of dep variable	0.412	0.449	0.459	0.443
Observations	13,918	14,906	13,650	14,088

Note: This table presents the coefficient estimates of the reform multiplier effect on government victories, with each column omitting a different specialized judicial bench subject to replacement (e.g., excluding Criminal Benches, Property Benches, Tax Benches, Writ Benches, etc.). Each column in the table methodically excludes cases from a specific specialized bench to assess the robustness of the reform multiplier effect. For instance, Column 1 excludes cases from criminal benches, whereas Column 2 reintroduces those while excluding property bench cases, and this pattern continues accordingly. The table provides estimates for coefficients α and β from Equation (1), with the state victory variable serving as the dependent variable—this is a dummy coded as one for cases ruled in favor of the state and zero otherwise. Executive Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first-generation appointed judge at the judicial bench (one degree of separation from the Executive appointments). The Executive Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the first 2nd-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive appointments). It switches on when the first 2nd-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges in a bench. The baseline estimates in each column of Equation (1) include district-bench or court-bench, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B11: Robustness via Exclusion of Regions (Divisonal High Courts) with Replacement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	abohc	banhc	dikhc	hydhc	Islhc	karhc	kashc	khyhc	larhc	lhrhc	mulhc	phc	quehc	rwphc	sibhc	sukhc
Exec. Vs	-0.0760*	-0.0809**	-0.0766*	-0.0784*	-0.0942**	-0.0909**	-0.0881**	-0.0924**	-0.0753*	-0.0877**	-0.0758*	-0.0855**	-0.0938**	-0.0892**	-0.0824**	-0.0367
1st Deg.	[0.0383]	[0.0393]	[0.0393]	[0.0402]	[0.0402]	[0.0448]	[0.0402]	[0.0387]	[0.0401]	[0.0401]	[0.0395]	[0.0377]	[0.0379]	[0.0381]	[0.0386]	[0.0286]
Exec . Vs	-0.249***	-0.251***	-0.253***	-0.318***	-0.253***	-0.258***	-0.247***	-0.259***	-0.259***	-0.234***	-0.238***	-0.235***	-0.267***	-0.259***	-0.251***	-0.250***
2nd Deg.	[0.0616]	[0.0598]	[0.0600]	[0.0470]	[0.0611]	[0.0656]	[0.0611]	[0.0606]	[0.0636]	[0.0598]	[0.0614]	[0.0564]	[0.0624]	[0.0587]	[0.0605]	[0.0601]
Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench Linear Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Stat. (1st Deg = 2nd Deg)	5.893	6.432	5.340	10.82	6.477	5.044	7.243	6.067	5.356	5.331	6.206	6.505	7.401	5.965	6.111	6.423
P -Value (1st Deg = 2nd Deg)	0.0189	0.0178	0.0150	0.000174	0.0341	0.0360	0.0328	0.0220	0.0174	0.0432	0.0280	0.0319	0.0193	0.0173	0.0204	0.00156
R-squared	0.160	0.171	0.167	0.172	0.165	0.175	0.167	0.166	0.167	0.172	0.169	0.166	0.169	0.169	0.165	0.162
Mean	0.447	0.443	0.441	0.444	0.442	0.439	0.440	0.439	0.439	0.438	0.442	0.441	0.438	0.442	0.443	0.433
Observations	18,136	17,554	18,432	17,350	18,350	15,330	18,270	18,340	17,380	16,258	17,866	18,168	17,420	18,344	18,230	17,382

Note: This table provides coefficient estimates for the reform multiplier effect on government victories, detailing coefficients α and β from equation (1) with the state victory variable as the dependent measure. This variable is a binary indicator, coded as one when the state wins in a case, and zero otherwise. Each column systematically excludes cases from a specific regional court: for instance, Column 1 excludes cases from the Abbottabad Region, while Column 2 reintroduces these and excludes cases from the Bahawalnagar High Court, and the pattern continues in subsequent columns. Standard errors, presented in brackets, are clustered at the district bench level. Exec. Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first-generation appointed judge at the judicial bench (one degree of separation from the Executive appointments). The Exec. Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the first 2nd-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive appointments). It switches on when the first 2nd-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges in a bench. The baseline estimates in each column of Equation (1) include district-bench or court-bench, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the court-by-bench level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B12: Robustness with Logit and Probit Models (Marginal Effects Reported)

	Logit		Probit	
	State Wins	Case Merits	*State Wins*	Case Merits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Executive Vs 1st Degree	-0.359*	0.461**	-0.221*	0.276**
	[0.187]	[0.180]	[0.113]	[0.108]
Executive Vs 2nd Degree	-1.753***	1.655***	-0.985***	0.907***
	[0.372]	[0.544]	[0.204]	[0.288]
Court-by-Bench and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value (1st Deg. = 2nd Deg.)	p-value < 0.01	p-value < 0.01	p-value < 0.01	p-value < 0.01
Mean of dep variable	0.440	0.663	0.440	0.663
Observations	18,850	18,850	18,850	18,850

Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates for the reform multiplier effect on the likelihood of government victories, providing estimates for coefficients α and β from Equation (1). Estimates are performed using the Logit model for Columns 1 and 2, and the Probit model for Columns 3 and 4, with the respective marginal effects reported in the table to aid comparison with baseline estimates by least squares. The dependent variable is a dummy, assigned a value of one when the state is the winning party in a case, and zero in all other instances. Executive Vs. 1st Degree is a variable that activates with the arrival of the first-generation appointed judge at the judicial bench (one degree of separation from the Executive appointments). The Executive Vs. 2nd Degree is a variable representing the arrival of the first 2nd-generation committee-appointed judge at the district bench (two degrees of separation from the Executive appointments). It switches on when the first 2nd-degree committee-appointed judge arrives at the bench and remains one. The comparison of judicial decisions is made relative to cases decided by the judges appointed by the executive in both cases. Controls include case type fixed effects (e.g., rights dispute or property dispute), presence of chief justice on the bench, number of lawyers on the case, number of judges on the case, and total judges in a bench. The baseline estimates in each column of Equation (1) include district-bench or court-bench, year-fixed effects, and bench-specific linear trends. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1