


# AI as Innovation in the Method of Innovation: Implications for Productivity Growth

**Carol Corrado**


*Center for Business and Public Policy,  
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University*

*Joint with: F. Bontadini (Luiss University), J. Haskel (Imperial  
College), and Cecilia Jona-Lasinio (Luiss Business School)*

**AEA Session “AI and productivity: Is this time different?”**  
*ASSA Meetings, Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa.  
Saturday, 2:30 pm, Jan 3, 2025*



# What I'll be talking about



## What approach to use to estimate impact of AI on productivity growth?

Existing literature is not dispositive  
AI is a powerful research tool, which suggests using an approach that captures AI as an IMI ... as well as a GPT

GPTs lead to systemic change in production structures, which suggests using an approach that looks at changes in composition of investment



## The intangibles-augmented growth accounting approach meets these needs:

Features the capture of **business investments** in innovation

Amenable to **modeling AI as an IMI as well as a GPT**

Can be taken to the **existing** data.



## Results and robustness

Results suggest **AI** contributed significantly to US labor productivity growth since 2017---1 percentage point annually

Not as large as ICT (yet). Still early days.


Is AI all a bubble? No, in terms of productivity growth, it seems that this time IS different.

# AI as innovation in innovation: Evidence from business functions

McKinsey survey evidence on the impact of genAI through the lens of business functions:

- Suggests AI is broader than automation...
  - AI affects many (mostly intangible) business functions
  - AI especially helps with product R&D and marketing/customer facing functions
- **Consistent with AI as an IMI as well as a GPT**

## Impact of genAI by business function



# Modeling AI as an IMI and a GPT

- Multi-sector approach
  - There is an **upstream, knowledge-producing** sector that generates long-lasting commercially valuable knowledge (intangible capital)
  - Other **downstream, knowledge-using** sector produce tangible capital and consumption goods
- The mechanism for treating AI as an IMI is that the upstream sector **uses AI technologies** to produce both AI-enabled intangibles and AI-enabled “brains” for tangible capital goods, e.g., autonomous vehicles
  - The upstream sector does not necessarily represent a collection of firms
  - Rather it mainly represents the business functions within firms that engage in knowledge production (R&D and/or product development departments, marketing teams, strategy teams, etc.)




ZipRecruiter salary estimates, histograms, trends and comparisons are derived from both employer job postings and third party data sources.


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## Handcrafted Knowledge AI



## Machine Learning AI




# Bringing the upstream/downstream model to the data

Intangibles-  
augmented  
growth  
accounting

## Focus on AI as software capital

- Production (**2017 NAICS 511, 518-9, and 5415**): Software publishing, Internet publishing computing infrastructure and data services, custom programming services and systems design; also includes legacy print media and excludes own production outside of these industries (data limitations prevent these adjustments).
- Use: Two asset types. **(A)** Software products acquired or internally developed by businesses; internal production of databases. **(B)** Software product R&D and embedded software R&D within other R&D activities.


## Calculations exclude spillovers



# Software capital: Where to find software R&D?

- Software R&D is an area of technology
- Its conduct (or use) is not confined to software industries.
  - e.g., R&D for autonomous vehicles “brains” may appear as motor vehicle industry R&D in the usual data—but rather is (embedded) software R&D.
- US R&D surveys have collected data by technology focus since 2001.
  - Estimates on national accounts basis developed for this paper.
- **US Software R&D grew very rapidly from 2017 to 2022.**

Software R&D: Estimate consistent with national accounts



# Software capital and US productivity growth

**Table 1. Productivity Growth and Software: Summary**

US Nonfarm Business Sector	2012 to 2017 (1)	2017 to 2024 (2)	Acceleration (3)
1. <u>Labor productivity growth (LPG)</u> <sup>1,3</sup>	.8	2.0	1.2
2. Contribution of software production and use <sup>2,3</sup>	.4	1.0	.6
2a. <i>(percentage share of line 1)</i>	.50	.51	.51
of which:			
3. Contribution of software industries	.2	.6	.4
3a. <i>(percentage share of line 1)</i>	.28	.30	.30
4. <u>Total factor productivity growth (TFPG)</u> <sup>1,3</sup>	.4	.9	.5
of which:			
5. Contribution of software industries	.1	.4	.2
5a. <i>(percentage share of line 4)</i>	.30	.37	.43

**Notes.** Software industries are the 2017 NAICS 511, 518-9, and 5415 industries. Software capital is the software component of Intellectual Property Products (IPP) and software product and embedded software R&D component of Business R&D.

1. Percent change

2. Percentage points

3. Based on natural log differences/points


**Sources.** Authors' elaboration of BLS productivity data files and NSF/NCSES BERD Survey data.

Taking the production and use of software capital as a reflection of the impact of AI technologies, their combined contributions indicate that AI has already had a significant impact on US productivity growth.

# Results in context of earlier technologies: AI still in early days

## Contributions to Productivity Growth (percentage points)


Nonfarm business sector (ICT and AI); Private industries (steam and electricity)



Source for blue bars: Crafts (2021, table 1); electricity includes spillovers. Source for red bars, this paper..


# TFP results in an industry context: **Not** a bubble

- Chart to the right shows industry-level TFP growth, where the width of each sector reflects the sector's production share
- Shows that the US digital sector (red bar) is a key driver of TFP growth
- ... and that US economy is **not** entirely dependent on its digital economy
- The large finance, retail, and manufacturing sectors are negative contributors to TFP growth
- ... but these 3 sectors are among **the 6 leading sectoral adopters of AI software** (according to IDC's AI software spending data)



# Summary

- AI is a breakthrough in the capabilities of software
  - Significant R&D resources have been devoted to developing knowledge-creating software and tools with intelligent capabilities in the United States
- Impact of AI is visible in **existing** US data
  - The contribution of software accounts both for 50% of labor productivity growth since 2012 and more than 40 percent of the acceleration in TFP growth from 2017 to 2024.
- Digitally-driven productivity growth in the US and elsewhere is not new, and likely to stay.




Thankyou.

[carol.corrado@georgetown.edu](mailto:carol.corrado@georgetown.edu)

(backup slides follow)

# Labor productivity..Wide estimates of the effect of AI

Predicted increase in annual labour productivity growth over a 10-year horizon due to AI (in percentage points)



Notes: joint effect of boost to TFP and induced capital deepening.  
Shaded areas in bars indicate bounds.

Source: [Fillippucci, Gall, Schief](#), 2024, Figure A10.

- Example calculation:

- [Acemoglu](#) (2025)=  
0.064pppa gains to TFP =>  
gain to Lab prod growth =  
0.12pppa with induced cap  
deepening

- [Fillippucci, Gall, Schief](#),  
2024 = 0.14-0.38pppa gains  
to TFP => gains to Lab prod  
0.36-0.93pa with induced  
cap deepening


# AI, GPTs and IMIs

- **GPT:** definition: “...pervasive use in a wide range of sectors and ... technological dynamism.” (Bresnahan, Trajtenberg, 1995)
  - Steam and electric motors generated more and cheaper power ... but also led to redesign of transportation equipment and factories
- **IMI** = “invention in the method of invention” (Alfred North Whitehead, 1925)
  - Hybrid corn (Griliches 1957)
  - AI as an IMI suggested in Cockburn, Stern, and Henderson (2019), Crafts (2021), Baily, Byrne, Kane, and Soto (2025).
- Note: Task accounting studies based on AI as a GPT
  - [Acemoglu](#) (2025) “I ... do not discuss how AI can have revolutionary effects by changing the process of science”
  - [Fillippucci, Gall, Schief](#) (2024) “We do not model the implications of an AI-driven acceleration of innovation, research or technological progress “



# What about the future? Suppose most intangibles are driven by AI agents...

Intangible Investment as a share of market sector GVA, 2019



Note. GVA is adjusted to include non-national accounts intangibles.

Faster upstream TFPG induces more downstream capital deepening

Contributions of AI as an IMI to labor productivity in steady growth

	Production and income share	Contributions	Upstream Productivity Advantage (percentage points)			
			.05	1	2.5	5
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1.	.05	Production	.03	.05	.13	.25
2.		Use	.04	.08	.21	.42
3.		<b>Total</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.33</b>	<b>.67</b>
4.	.10	Production	.05	.10	.25	.50
5.		Use	.08	.17	.42	.83
6.		<b>Total</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.27</b>	<b>.67</b>	<b>1.33</b>
7.	.15	Production	.08	.15	.38	.75
8.		Use	.13	.25	.63	1.25
9.		<b>Total</b>	<b>.20</b>	<b>.40</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>2.00</b>

Note. Totals may not add to components due to rounding. Figures constructed assuming the labor share is .60.