

Online Appendix

“Why is Sexual Harassment Underreported?
The Value of Outside Options Amid the Threat of Retaliation”

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A Model Appendix

This appendix has two parts. The first part works out the comparative statics of the two-stage reporting model introduced in Section 5. The second part presents a simple model for firm behavior which is consistent with the comparative statics worked out in the first part.

A.1 Details on Comparative Statics

To calculate the comparative statics of the model, we work backwards from stage 2. We focus on how changes in u affect the reporting threshold; changes in b are similar. For case (i) in stage 2, using the definitions of V_2^u and V_2^e , equation 2 can be rewritten with the expected gains on one side and the expected losses on the other:

$$\theta_2\alpha + (1 - \theta_2)p_2^{nr}(\alpha)\alpha + \psi^{nr}(\alpha) \geq \theta_2[w - q(u)w' - (1 - q(u))b] + c_2^{nr} \quad (8)$$

Since the left-hand side is increasing in α while the right-hand side is constant with respect to α , we can define the threshold level of harassment above which an employee will report, $\bar{\alpha}_2^{nr}$, as the level of α that satisfies equation (8) with equality. This allows us to analyze how the reporting threshold $\bar{\alpha}_2^{nr}$ responds to a lower value of becoming unemployed. To calculate comparative statics, we define an implicit reporting function, $R(\bar{\alpha}_2^{nr}, u)$, based on equation (8). Using the implicit function theorem to take derivatives, it is easy to verify that $\delta\bar{\alpha}_2^{nr}/\delta u$ is positive. For case (ii) in stage 2, the reporting threshold $\bar{\alpha}_2^r$ is constant with respect to u .

Turning to the first stage, the option value of filing can be expressed as $(1 - \theta_1)\max[\theta_2V_2^u + (1 - \theta_2)V_2^e - c_2^{nr} + p_2^{nr}(\alpha)\gamma(\alpha) - w + \alpha, 0] + \theta_1\max[p_2^r(\alpha)\gamma(\alpha) - c_2^r, 0]$. Substituting this expression into equation 1 and using similar logic as above, the LHS is increasing in α and the RHS is decreasing in α , so we again have a threshold model and can characterize how the reporting threshold for the first stage, $\bar{\alpha}_1$, depends on the unemployment rate. Using the implicit function theorem, the reporting threshold $\bar{\alpha}_1$ is increasing in u , as $\theta_1\partial V_1^u/\partial\alpha > 0$ and the derivative of the option value terms with respect to u are both non-negative. In other words,

there is positive selection of cases in terms of severity which make it to the second stage.³⁰

So, in sum, there are two reasons for why the severity of cases increases when unemployment rises (or UI benefits decrease): (i) there is positive selection of cases which make it to stage 2 and (ii) conditional on making it to stage 2, severity increases because the threat of a retaliatory firing makes filing more costly in a high unemployment rate environment. The testable implication is that merit rates should be higher when unemployment increases or UI benefits are reduced.

A.2 Firm behavior

We now present a simple model for firm behavior which is consistent with the comparative statics outlined above. We assume the firm knows their workers' average reporting threshold, but not the individual-specific costs of reporting which we have modeled as random variables (c_1, c_2^{nr}, c_2^r) . A firm's expected profit will depend on the amount of harassment they allow in the workplace. Expected profit could depend on the level of harassment for more than one reason: it could harm productivity of harassed workers (and others around them) but it could also be costly to eliminate (highly productive managers or coworkers could gain utility from committing harassment).

We assume the firm has a piecewise expected profit function: (i) $\pi(\alpha) = f(\alpha)$ if the level of harassment is low enough that the worker does not report to the EEOC and (ii) $\pi(\alpha) = f(\alpha) - r(\alpha)$ if the worker reports. The term $r(\alpha)$ captures the cost to the firm of being reported to the EEOC; it includes the expected financial payout to the victim as well as any reputational costs or declines in employee morale once a firm is publicly accused.³¹ We assume that $f(\alpha)$ is concave in α with a maximum at some α^* and that $r(\alpha)$ is convex in α . The concavity condition implies a declining benefit to allowing more harassment in the

³⁰If the model is expanded to allow the opportunity cost of filing to depend on the unemployment rate, the comparative statics continue to hold as long as the time costs of filing are relatively small compared to other factors in the model.

³¹The EEOC regularly issues press releases on the outcomes of litigated cases (<https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/search>).

workplace which could eventually turn negative, while the convexity condition implies that costs are increasing at an increasing rate as harassment becomes more severe.³² We assume that the costs of being reported are large enough that the piecewise expected profit function does not achieve a maximum at a severity level where the firm expects to be reported.

This model of firm behavior reinforces the prediction that merit rates should increase as the labor market weakens. The reason is that when workers' average threshold for reporting increases, the firm will optimally respond by engaging in more severe harassment. Empirically, we cannot tell how much of the increase in merit we observe as labor markets deteriorate is due to workers' higher reporting thresholds versus the firm's increased misbehavior in response to higher thresholds.

A natural extension would be to allow θ_1 and θ_2 be functions of the business cycle, with $\delta\theta_1/\delta u > 0$ and $\delta\theta_2/\delta u > 0$. This could arise since the cost of firing a victim is lower when the firm can easily replace her from a larger pool of unemployed workers. This would further reinforce the prediction that merit should increase as labor market conditions deteriorate.

If firms respond either by increasing severity or retaliation, a sufficient condition for the merit prediction to hold is that a worker does not prefer being fired relative to keeping her job after an internal report for any level of harassment (i.e., the worker prefers case (i) to case (ii) in the model). This ensures that the worker does not file in the first stage in the hopes of being fired just so that she can get a substantially larger payout because there was a retaliatory firing. Empirically, we find that the expected payouts for an EEOC filing are relatively small, regardless of whether there was retaliation, suggesting this assumption is reasonable.³³

Our model assumes that $f(\alpha)$ and $r(\alpha)$ do not depend on the business cycle. A potential alternative explanation is that a firm's ability to defend itself against an EEOC charge is correlated with a worker's outside options. For example, when unemployment is high during

³²Similar models for firm profits can be applied to both internal and EEOC reporting.


³³Average EEOC payouts with and without a retaliatory charge are \$6,008 and \$6,309, respectively. Even the 95th percentile of expected EEOC payouts are relatively small (\$23,809 and \$22,360 for charges with and without retaliation).

a recession, a firm may have fewer financial resources to fight an EEOC claim. However, this alternative explanation is not consistent with the rise in merit we find following cuts to UI benefits, since the reduction in publicly-provided benefits we study should not have affected firm resources.

While the implication of our model is that the severity of harassment α will increase in response to a higher worker reporting threshold, reported charge volume could go up or down. This is because charge volume depends on the distribution of reporting costs for the worker relative to the derivatives of expected firm benefits $f(\alpha)$ and costs $r(\alpha)$. Absent any firm response, however, the model does have a prediction on volume: reported volume should fall more as the reporting threshold rises when outside options deteriorate.


B Online Figures and Tables

Figure A1: EEOC Charge Filing Process and Resolution for Sexual Harassment Charges




Flow chart describing the order of events, beginning with the discriminatory action and ending with the resolution of the EEOC discrimination charge. An employee must file a charge within 180 calendar days of the offense; this deadline is extended to 300 days for claims also covered by state or local anti-discrimination laws. Within 10 days of the receipt of the charge, the agency sends a notice of the charge to the named employer. At this point, the case is referred to mediation, where a neutral third party assists the parties in coming to a voluntary agreement. If the employer decides against mediation, they are required to provide a written response to the charge. The discovery process then begins, which takes approximately 10 months on average. Following its investigation, the agency determines whether the case has reasonable cause. Percentages in parentheses are for Sexual Harassment charges in our baseline sample.

Figure A2: Google Searches for “unemployment benefits”




Google Search Index for “unemployment benefits” for North Carolina versus other Southern States. The NC UI reform was passed in February of 2013 and became effective in July of 2013. The Federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Program expired at the end of 2013. Google Search Indices are normalized to be 1 on January of 2012.

Figure A3: Unemployment Elasticity of Merit, by Discrimination Type (Alt. Specification)




Coefficient plot for elasticities of merit with respect to county unemployment for top issues (Demotion-Wages) and bases (ADA-Sex:Male). Regressions mirror those in Table 5, except that we allow other categories to include sexual harassment as an issue. Excluded from the figure is intimidation, since this is an outlier which distorts the scale of the graph; the unemployment elasticity for these cases is -0.048 (0.022). Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure A4: Sensitivity of Merit and Volume to Unemployment, by Sexual Harassment Status (commuting zone variation)



In panels (a), (b), and (c), the y-axis measures the fraction of charges determined to have merit by the EEOC in a CZ-month unemployment rate bin, for charges including a sexual harassment claim, excluding all harassment and sexual harassment claims, and including only (non-sexual) harassment claims, respectively. Demographic controls (sex, race, national origin, and age) along with CZ fixed effects and time by agency fixed effects are residualized out. In panels (d), (e), and (f), the y-axis measures the volume of charges filed per 100,000 in the labor force in a CZ-month unemployment rate bin, for each of the three corresponding categories above. The fixed effects for CZ and time by agency are residualized out. Observations are weighted by the CZ's labor force and cover the period from 1995-2016.


Figure A5: Sensitivity of Merit and Volume to Unemployment, by Sexual Harassment Status (state x industry variation)



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
In panels (a), (b), and (c), the y-axis measures the fraction of charges determined to have merit by the EEOC in a state-industry-month unemployment rate bin, for charges including a sexual harassment claim, excluding all harassment and sexual harassment claims, and including only (non-sexual) harassment claims, respectively. Demographic controls (sex, race, national origin, and age) along with state by industry fixed effects and time by agency fixed effects are residualized out. In panels (d), (e), and (f), the y-axis measures the volume of charges filed per 100,000 in the labor force in a state-industry-month unemployment rate bin, for each of the three corresponding categories above. Fixed effects for state by industry and time by agency are residualized out. Observations are weighted by the industry share of employment in each state's labor force and cover the period from 2000-2016.

Figure A6: Sexual Harassment Merit and Charges by % Male and % Managers Male within Establishments



Female SH Merit and Charge Rate, respectively, measure the fraction of sexual harassment charges filed by women determined to have merit by the EEOC, and the number of charges filed by women divided by the number of women in an establishment. % Male and % Managers Male, respectively, are the fraction of males and fraction of managers who are male in an establishment. All plots residualize out county and month-year by agency (EEOC or FEPA) fixed effects. Linear and quadratic regression lines appear in the top and bottom panels, respectively. Sample period covers 1995-2015.


Figure A7: Non-white Harassment Merit and Charges by % White and % Managers White within Establishments




Non-white H Charge Merit and Rate, respectively, measure the fraction of racial or ethnic harassment charges filed by non-whites determined to have merit by the EEOC, and the number of charges filed by nonwhites divided by the number of nonwhites in an establishment. % White and % Managers White, respectively, are the fraction of whites and fraction of managers who are white in an establishment. All plots residualize out county and month-year by agency (EEOC or FEPA) fixed effects. Linear and quadratic regression lines appear in the top and bottom panels, respectively. Sample period covers 1995-2015.

Figure A8: Synthetic DiD for North Carolina UI Reform

(a) Using Synthetic DiD





(b) Adjusted Outcome Difference and Synthetic Weights




The top panel shows residualized merit on sexual harassment charges after netting out time by agency fixed effects for North Carolina relative to its weighted average among control states, using the synthetic difference-in-differences method developed by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). Time-period weights are indicated by the subgraph below the main merit plots. The bottom panel shows the adjusted outcome difference between North Carolina and the placebo states, with the dot size reflecting the unit weights contributed by each donor state (the weight values are provided in Table A14.) We exclude from the set of donor and placebo states all those with fewer than 15 sexual harassment charges in any one time period.

Figure A9: Volume of Charges for North Carolina versus Other Southern States




The top panel reports log monthly sexual harassment charges filed in North Carolina versus Other Southern States, while the bottom panel reports associated event-study coefficients. Log monthly sexual harassment charges are normalized to 0 in the year prior to the reform. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. See Figure 3 for the list of Other Southern States.

Figure A10: Selectivity of Sexual Harassment Charges for Moderate Reform States




Event-study plot for the six moderate reform states of Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina, relative to the control group of other Southern and Midwestern states. See Figure 3 for a list of other Southern States. Other Midwestern states include Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Illinois is dropped because it implemented a small, temporary UI reform). Merit is the fraction of charges determined to have merit by the EEOC. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Coefficient is the estimated merit effect in a regression which includes fixed effects for county and year by agency. Estimates and standard errors use the Borusyak et al. (2021) method.

Figure A11: Selectivity of Sexual Harassment Charges for Individual Moderate Reform States



Each panel reports raw average merit of EEOC charges in each state relative to non-reform states in the same Census region. Merit is the fraction of charges determined to have merit by the EEOC, normalized to 0 in the year prior to the reform. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. See Figure 3 for the list of Other Southern States and Figure A10 for other Midwestern states.

Figure A12: Volume of Sexual Harassment Charges for Individual Moderate Reform States



Each panel reports raw average log monthly volume of SH charges in each state relative to non-reform states in the same Census region. Log average monthly volume is normalized to 0 in the year prior to the reform. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. See Figure 3 for the list of Other Southern States and Figure A10 for other Midwestern states.

Table A1: Types of Issues Raised in Sexual Harassment Charges which Involve Retaliation

	Issues Raised
Firing	0.695
Discipline	0.110
Wages	0.054
Suspension	0.039
Promotion	0.037
Demotion	0.035
Charges	112,117

Data are from EEOC Charge Database, 1995-2016.

Table A2: Reasonable Cause and Settlement for Sexual Harassment Charges

<i>Type Outcome</i>	All			Discharge or Retaliation			No Discharge or Retaliation		
	Reasonable Cause	Reasonable Cause	Settle	Reasonable Cause	Reasonable Cause	Settle	Reasonable Cause	Reasonable Cause	Settle
Dep var = 1(<i>merit</i>)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
# unemployed _{ct} †	9.55 (4.35)	13.0 (5.15)	7.03 (5.90)	8.22 (5.09)	11.1 (6.06)	6.85 (5.19)	15.6 (6.97)	22.5 (8.02)	11.8 (13.8)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp	0.00043	0.00058	0.00031	0.00036	0.00049	0.00030	0.00072	0.00104	0.00055
Mean(Dep var)	0.070	0.086	0.185	.070	0.086	0.183	0.069	0.086	0.191
% change	0.61	0.68	0.17	0.52	0.58	0.17	1.04	1.21	0.29
Elasticity	0.036	0.040	0.010	0.031	0.034	0.010	0.060	0.071	0.017
Conditional on not settling		X			X			X	
County and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
N charges	194,879	158,817	194,879	156,623	127,850	156,623	37,739	30,430	37,739
R ²	0.0552	0.0642	0.0440	0.0575	0.0671	0.0489	0.122	0.140	0.0908

Regressions mirror those in Table 4 and are based on the sample period of 1995-2016. 'Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp' is the implied effect of a one percentage point increase in a county monthly unemployment rate on the fraction of charges found to have reasonable cause by the EEOC or which are settled. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10⁻⁸

Table A3: Charge Quality using CZ or State x Industry Variation in Unemployment

<i>Variation</i> <i>Charge Type</i>	Commuting Zone			State x Industry		
	SH	O	H	SH	O	H
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{zt} †	6.16 (2.41)	0.10 (2.51)	-1.19 (1.71)			
# unemployed _{jst} †				24.5 (10.5)	10.1 (7.04)	14.3 (8.77)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp	0.00074	0.00001	-0.00018	0.00140	0.00062	0.00093
Mean(merit)	0.255	0.181	0.190	.263	0.185	0.194
% change	0.29	0.01	-0.09	0.52	0.33	0.48
Elasticity	0.017	0.000	-0.006	0.027	0.017	0.025
CZ and time FEs	X	X	X			
State x industry, time FEs				X	X	X
N charges	195,031	1,520,144	364,159	91,260	775,849	185,980
R ²	0.030	0.016	0.017	0.033	0.017	0.026

Regressions mirror those in Table 4 and use a sample period of 1995-2016 (2000-2016 for columns 4-6). The state x industry estimates are available only beginning in 2000 as the BLS does not report industry-level unemployment before this time. ‘Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp’ is the implied effect of a one percentage point increase in a CZ (or state-industry) monthly unemployment rate on the fraction of charges found to have had merit by the EEOC. Robust standard errors, clustered at the commuting zone (state) level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-8}

Table A4: Alternative Measure of Labor Market Tightness

Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	Sexual Harassment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
unemployment rate _{ct}	0.404 (0.199)		
unemployment rate _{zt}		0.767 (0.365)	
unemployment rate _{jst}			0.188 (0.221)
Effect of 1 pp \uparrow UR	0.0040	0.0077	0.0019
Mean(merit)	.255	.255	.264
% change	1.59	3.01	0.71
County, CZ, or State x Industry FEs	X	X	X
Time FEs	X	X	X
N charges	194,879	195,030	89,161
R ²	0.034	0.028	0.048

These regressions mirror those in Tables 4 and A3, use the sample period of 1995-2016 for columns 1 and 2 and 2000-2016 for column 3, but instead of using the number unemployed, they use the unemployment rate. Column 1 reports county level estimates, column 2 reports CZ level estimates, and column 3 reports state x industry level estimates. Estimates are weighted by the size of the labor force. Measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or CZ or state) level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A5: Unemployment and EEOC Charge Quality, Alternative Clustering

<i>Charge type</i>	Sexual Harassment		All Other	Other Harassment		
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{ct}	16.6 (6.29)	15.9 (6.38)	1.97 (3.97)	-0.08 (4.03)	6.11 (6.73)	4.81 (6.76)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp mean(merit)	0.00074 0.255	0.00071 0.255	0.00010 0.181	-0.00000 0.181	0.00035 0.190	0.00028 0.190
% change	0.29	0.28	0.06	-0.00	0.19	0.15
Elasticity	0.017	0.016	0.003	-0.000	0.011	0.009
County and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Other issues and bases FEs		X		X		X
N	194,883	194,883	1,520,122	1,520,122	364,009	364,009
R ²	0.042	0.043	0.018	0.024	0.024	0.027

Regressions mirror those in Table 4 and use the sample period of 1995-2016. Robust standard errors, clustered at the EEOC receiving office level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-8}

Table A6: Sexual Harassment Charge Quality and Volume Controlling for Imputed Layoffs and Discharges

	Merit	Volume
	(1)	(2)
# unemployed _{jst} †	10.7 (12.3)	-4.38 (4.04)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp mean(dep var)	0.00061 .263	-6.64 574.8
% change	0.23	-1.16
Elasticity	0.013	-0.069
State x industry and time FEs	X	X
N	78,110	101,818
R ²	0.035	0.513

These regressions mirror those in Table 4, adding in as extra controls the imputed number of layoffs and discharges in a state-month-industry using JOLTS data. The average size of the national labor force is 151.639 million. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. Sample covers 2001-2016, the main sample years for which the experimental state-industry JOLTS data are available.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-8}

Table A7: Charge Volume using CZ or State x Industry Variation in Unemployment

<i>Variation</i> <i>Charge Type</i>	Commuting Zone			State x Industry		
	SH	O	H	SH	O	H
Dep var = # of charges	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{zt} †	-5.17 (4.82)	107 (15.1)	31.1 (32.1)			
# unemployed _{jst} †				-6.53 (4.67)	-34.4 (18.4)	-6.99 (14.6)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp	-7.74	157.8	46.0	-9.86	-52.0	-10.8
Mean(charges)	977.1	7,673.5	1,794.9	587.2	4,826.2	1,174.6
% change	-0.80	2.06	2.56	-1.68	-1.08	-0.92
Elasticity	-0.045	0.119	0.149	-0.101	-0.065	-0.054
CZ and time FEs	X	X	X			
State x industry, time FEs				X	X	X
N (cells)	178,344	178,092	178,344	128,814	128,814	128,814
labor force size (thous.)	149,804	149,804	149,804	151,055	151,055	151,055
R ²	0.786	0.874	0.814	0.507	0.662	0.638

These regressions and sample periods mirror those in Table A3, but use the number of charges filed as the dependent variable. Regression coefficients estimate the change in charges filed for a 1,000,000 person increase in the number unemployed. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ (state) level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A8: Unemployment and Sexual Harassment Charge Volume by Type

Dep var = # of charges	Discharge		Retaliation		Disch. or Retal.	
	<i>Yes</i> (1)	<i>No</i> (2)	<i>Yes</i> (3)	<i>No</i> (4)	<i>Yes</i> (5)	<i>No</i> (6)
# unemployed _{zt} †	-5.71 (2.77)	-6.72 (3.64)	2.54 (2.01)	-15.0 (5.07)	-5.75 (3.88)	-6.68 (2.53)
Effect of 1 pp ↑	-8.53	-10.0	3.80	-22.4	-8.59	-9.99
mean(# national charges)	635.3	391.6	581.6	445.3	816.9	210.1
% change	-1.34	-2.56	0.65	-5.04	-1.05	-4.75
Elasticity	-0.079	-0.151	0.038	-0.296	-0.062	-0.279
county and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N (cells)	729,234	728,778	729,485	728,572	728,978	729,009
R ²	0.627	0.541	0.639	0.509	0.683	0.382

These regressions mirror those in Table 6. The average size of the national labor force is 149.804 million. Time FEs are at the year-month agency level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-6}

Table A9: Gendered Power Dynamics, Robustness

	SH	O	H	SH	O	H
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{ct} × %men _{estab} †	7.47 (1.54)	-0.34 (0.80)	1.55 (0.97)			
# unemployed _{ct} × %male managers _{estab} †				5.94 (1.46)	0.09 (0.72)	0.56 (1.27)
sd(% men or % male mgrs.)	0.225	0.231	0.230	0.253	0.269	0.277
Effect of 1 sd ↑ % men or % male mgrs. on 1 pp ↑ unemp	0.00091	-0.00004	0.00023	0.00081	0.00000	0.00010
Mean(merit)	.248	.188	.188	.248	.188	.188
% change	0.37	-0.02	0.12	0.33	0.00	0.05
County and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N charges	27,808	180,425	46,583	26,986	175,423	45,154
R ²	0.087	0.034	0.063	0.089	0.035	0.064

Regressions mirror those in Table 7 and are based on the sample period of 1995-2015. Data links individual sexual harassment charges (the EEOC Charge data) with the characteristics of each establishment against which the charges are filed (the EEO-1 files). Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-7}

Table A10: Gendered Power Dynamics, Volume

	SH	O	H	SH	O	H
Dep var = charges/female employee	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{ct} × %men _{estab} †	-5.94 (6.06)	3.18 (8.77)	2.33 (3.88)			
# unemployed _{ct} × %male managers _{estab} †				-2.51 (3.40)	2.77 (4.10)	-0.85 (2.44)
sd(% men or % male mgrs.)	0.265	0.265	0.265	0.346	0.346	0.346
Effect of 1 sd ↑ % men or % male mgrs. on 1 pp ↑ unemp	-0.00024	0.00013	0.00009	-0.00013	0.00010	-0.00004
Mean(charge rate)	.00017	.00080	.00023	.00017	.00080	.00023
% change	-140.6	15.7	39.4	-77.5	17.9	-18.7
County and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N establishment-years	7,205,118	7,205,118	7,205,118	7,205,118	7,205,118	7,205,118
R ²	0.010	0.036	0.015	0.010	0.036	0.015

Regressions mirror those in Table 7 and are based on the sample period of 1995-2015. Data links individual sexual harassment charges (the EEOC Charge data) with the characteristics of each establishment against which the charges are filed (the EEO-1 files) from 1995-2015. ‘Effect of 1 sd ↑ % men or % male mgrs.’ is the implied effect of a one percentage point increase in a county’s monthly unemployment rate interacted with the % of men or % of male managers in an establishment on the respective charge rate for female employees. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-10}

Table A11: Power Dynamics by Race or Ethnicity: Harassment within a Workplace, Merit

Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	(1)	(2)
$\# unemployed_{ct} \times \%white_{estab}^{\dagger}$	-2.13 (0.77)	
$\# unemployed_{ct} \times \%white managers_{estab}^{\dagger}$		-1.21 (0.78)
sd(% men or % male mgrs.)	0.250	0.229
Effect of 1 sd \uparrow % white or % white mgrs. on 1 pp \uparrow unemp	-0.00035	-0.00018
Mean(merit)	.186	.186
% change	-0.19	-0.10
County and time FEs	X	X
N charges	42,270	42,270
R ²	0.078	0.078

Regressions and sample mirror those in Table 7. Bolded ‘Effect of 1 sd \uparrow % white or % white mgrs.’ is the implied effect of a one percentage point increase in a county’s monthly unemployment rate interacted with the % of white employees or % of white managers in an establishment on the fraction of charges found to have had merit by the EEOC. Additional controls include an individual’s race, sex, and age, the number of unemployed, the number of establishments, establishment size, and the % white employees or % white managers. Time FEs are year-month by agency controls, and robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.

[†] Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-7}

Table A12: Power Dynamics by Race or Ethnicity: Harassment within a Workplace, Volume

Dep var = charges/non-white employee		
# unemployed _{ct} × %white _{estab} [‡]	-18.6 (2.91)	
# unemployed _{ct} × %white managers _{estab} [‡]		-7.29 (3.02)
sd(% men or % male mgrs.)	0.271	0.297
Effect of 1 sd ↑ % white or % white mgrs. on 1 pp ↑ unemp	-0.00075	-0.00032
Mean(charge rate)	.00040	.00040
% change	-187.1	-80.4
County and time FEs	X	X
N establishment-years	6,558,918	6,558,918
R ²	0.018	0.018

Regressions mirror those in Table A11, except the outcome variable is the charge rate for non-white employees. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.

[‡] Coefficients are multiplied by 10⁻¹⁰

Table A13: North Carolina UI Reform and Sexual Harassment Charge Quality

Panel A: First Stage		
<i>Other Southern States as Controls</i>		
Dep var = UI reciprocity rate _{st}	(1)	(2)
North Carolina × post	-0.198 (0.003)	
Dep mean NC pre-reform	.460	
State and time FEs	X	
N charges	9,953	
R ²	0.819	
Panel B: Reduced Form and IV		
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	Reduced Form	IV
North Carolina × post	0.067 (0.024)	
UI reciprocity rate _{st}		-0.340 (0.134)
Dep mean NC pre-reform	.211	.211
% change	31.8	
State and time FEs	X	X
N charges	9,953	9,953
R ²	0.025	0.022

See Figure 3 for the list of Other Southern States and column (1) of Table A14 for the set of synthetic control weights. Sample period is from July of 2009 through September of 2016. Time FEs are year-month by agency controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A14: Synthetic Control Unit-Weights

State	(1)
Alabama	0.0666
Arizona	0.0800
California	0.0422
Colorado	0.0241
Connecticut	0.0219
Indiana	0.0819
Louisiana	0.0500
Maryland	0.0643
Mississippi	0.0345
New Mexico	0.0549
Nevada	0.0594
New York	0.0330
Ohio	0.0329
Oregon	0.0586
Pennsylvania	0.0314
Tennessee	0.0488
Texas	0.0451
Virginia	0.0569
Washington	0.0586
Wisconsin	0.0548

Weights are provided for synthetic difference-in-differences estimation of the effect of North Carolina's UI reform on merit of sexual harassment charges. States with fewer than 15 sexual harassment charges in any time period are excluded.

Table A15: UI Reductions and Sexual Harassment Charge Quality, by Charge Type

	Discharge		Retaliation		Disch. or Retal.	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(merit)$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
treated state(s) \times post	0.036 (0.007)	0.016 (0.016)	0.033 (0.010)	0.024 (0.014)	0.035 (0.008)	0.016 (0.021)
Mean(pre-reform merit)	.237	.258	.244	.246	.243	.253
% change	15.0	6.3	13.3	9.7	14.2	6.2
County and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N charges	22,724	12,002	23,341	11,395	29,413	5,362

Regressions mirror those in Table 8, except they combine NC with all moderate reform states in a staggered difference-in-differences design. Column 2 excludes discharges but could include retaliation, column 4 excludes retaliation but could include discharges, and column 6 excludes both discharges and retaliation. All columns use as controls Other Southern and Midwestern States (see Figures 3 and A10 for the list of states). Sample period is from July of 2009 (July of 2008 for columns 4-6) through September of 2016. Time FEs are year-month by agency (EEOC or FEPA) controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A16: UI Reductions and Volume

<i>Charge type</i>	<i>NC UI Reform</i>			<i>Moderate UI Reforms</i>		
	Sexual Harassment	Other	Harassment	Sexual Harassment	Other	Harassment
Dep var = log(charges)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
treated state(s) × post	-0.023 (0.075)	0.049 (0.062)	0.137 (0.058)	0.039 (0.044)	-0.026 (0.036)	0.077 (0.065)
Mean(monthly charges)	28.9	299.4	75.0	31.9	259.5	63.2
State and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N (state-month cells)	712	750	746	1,924	2,001	1,985
R ²	0.845	0.957	0.918			

Columns (1)-(3) use as controls Other Southern States and columns (4)-(6) use as controls Other Southern and Midwestern States (see Figures 3 and A10 for the list of states). Sample period is from July of 2009 (July of 2008 for columns 4-6) through September of 2016. Time FEs are year-month by agency controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state by year level (columns 1-3) or state level (columns 4-6), are reported in parentheses.

Table A17: Sensitivity of Violations of Parallel Trends to Smoothness Restrictions for SH event-studies

M	<i>NC</i> <i>UI Reform</i>		<i>Moderate</i> <i>UI Reforms</i>	
	Lower Bound (1)	Upper Bound (2)	Lower Bound (3)	Upper Bound (4)
(original)	0.052	0.154	0.021	0.066
0.00	0.033	0.139	0.013	0.065
0.01	0.028	0.163	0.005	0.085
0.02	0.020	0.192	0.003	0.112
0.03	0.018	0.222	0.001	0.131
0.04	0.009	0.241	-0.009	0.141
0.05	0.000	0.259	-0.019	0.151
0.06	-0.008	0.276	-0.029	0.161

This tests the sensitivity of the event-study results to violations of smoothness restrictions (Rambachan and Roth, 2023). The first column indicates by how much the slope of the pre-trend can change across consecutive periods. The remaining columns show the resulting upper and lower bounds for 95% confidence intervals of the effect size as the parallel pre-trends assumption is further relaxed.

Table A18: Unemployment and SH Charge Quality, by High versus Low-Wage Industries

<i>Charge Type</i>	Sexual Harassment		Other		Harassment	
	< median wage	> median wage	< median wage	> median wage	< median wage	> median wage
<i>Sample</i>						
Dep var = $\mathbb{1}(\textit{merit})$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{<i>jst</i>} [†]	19.5 (28.2)	25.3 (18.8)	18.7 (9.82)	2.73 (6.55)	16.1 (12.1)	11.7 (9.25)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp	0.00112	0.00139	0.00125	0.00016	0.00114	0.00072
Mean(merit)	0.275	0.250	0.197	0.177	0.203	0.187
% change	0.40	0.55	0.64	0.09	0.56	0.38
Elasticity	0.023	0.027	0.035	0.004	0.031	0.019
State x industry, time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N charges	46,734	44,483	319,575	456,251	76,440	109,490
R ²	0.042	0.043	0.018	0.021	0.035	0.031

Regressions mirror Table 4 and use the sample period of 2000-2016. The state x industry estimates are available only beginning in 2000 as the BLS does not report industry-level unemployment before this time. Samples are split on the basis of whether a worker is in an industry whose median wage is below the median across all industries. There are 238 industries at the NAICS-4 level in the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses.

[†] Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-8}

Table A19: Unemployment and SH Charge Volume, by High versus Low-Wage Industries

<i>Charge Type</i>	Sexual Harassment		Other		Harassment	
	< median wage	> median wage	< median wage	> median wage	< median wage	> median wage
<i>Sample</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep var = # of charges	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
# unemployed _{st} †	-12.7 (10.4)	-0.80 (18.8)	-96.1 (34.6)	10.6 (10.7)	-16.2 (28.9)	-1.31 (3.16)
Effect of 1 pp ↑ unemp mean(dep var)	-11.0 370.9	-0.50 190.1	-83.3 2,748.1	6.61 1,767.5	-14.0 686.2	-0.82 420.6
% change	-2.98	-0.26	-3.03	0.37	-2.05	-0.19
Elasticity	-0.176	-0.015	-0.179	0.022	-0.121	-0.01
State x industry and time FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
N (cells)	59,634	59,634	59,634	59,478	59,634	59,478
labor force size (thous.)	86,923	62,353	86,644	62,353	86,644	62,353
R ²	0.523	0.448	0.736	0.553	0.645	0.681

Regressions mirror Table 4 and use the sample period of 2000-2016. The state x industry estimates are available only beginning in 2000 as the BLS does not report industry-level unemployment before this time. Samples are split on the basis of whether a worker is in an industry whose median wage is below the median across all sectors. Regression coefficients estimate the change in charges filed for a 1,000,000 person increase in the number unemployed. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ (state) level, are reported in parentheses.

† Coefficients are multiplied by 10^{-6}