Replication data for: Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes

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Project Citation:

Fernández, Raquel, and Wong, Joyce Cheng. Replication data for: Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114130V1

Project Description

Summary: During the 1970s, the United States switched from mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Who benefited/lost from this change? We develop a dynamic life cycle model in which agents make consumption, saving, work, and marital-status decisions under a given divorce regime. Calibrating the model to match key moments for the 1940 cohort and conditioning solely on gender, our ex ante welfare analysis finds that women fare better under mutual consent whereas men prefer a unilateral system. Conditioning as well on initial productivity (expected income), we find that the top three quintiles of men and the top two quintiles of women prefer unilateral divorce.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
      J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      K36 Family and Personal Law

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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