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Project Citation: 

Sautmann, Anja. Replication data for: Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114346V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with positive sorting by age include all strictly increasing functions and constant flow payoffs enjoyed for some finite period.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Simulation
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) program source code


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