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Project Citation: 

Ito, Koichiro, Ida, Takanori, and Tanaka, Makoto. Replication data for: Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114688V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for economic activities. To investigate persistence of such interventions, we randomly assign households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation during peak-demand hours. We find significant habituation and dishabituation for moral suasion—the treatment effect diminishes after repeated interventions but can be restored to the original level by a sufficient time interval between interventions. Economic incentives induce larger treatment effects, little habituation, and significant habit formation. Our results suggest moral suasion and economic incentives produce substantially different short-run and long-run policy impacts.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C93 Field Experiments
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      L94 Electric Utilities
      L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
      Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
      Q48 Energy: Government Policy


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