Replication data for: Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Rema Hanna; Shing-Yi Wang
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| AEJPol-2015-0029.R3_replication | 10/13/2019 04:03:AM | ||
|
|
text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/13/2019 12:03:AM |
Project Citation:
Hanna, Rema, and Wang, Shing-Yi. Replication data for: Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114629V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.