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Project Citation: 

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Agarwal, Nikhil, and Pathak, Parag A. Replication data for: The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113104V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I21 Analysis of Education
      I28 Education: Government Policy


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