Equity Aversion: Social Norms and the Desire to Be Ahead
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4,
no. 4, November 2012
(pp. 131-44)
Abstract
Inequity aversion models have dominated the behavioral economics landscape in the last decade. This study uses variants of dictator and trust games to provide empirical content to these models. We manipulate market features—such as competition over resources—to demonstrate that extant models cannot explain realistic manipulations of either game. For example, we show that if socially acceptable actions provide one player with a greater portion of the rents, she will put forth extra effort to secure them, to the detriment of the other person. When she can earn more than the other player through customary actions, we find a preference for selfishness. (JEL C71, C70, D03, Z13)Citation
Fershtman, Chaim, Uri Gneezy, and John A. List. 2012. "Equity Aversion: Social Norms and the Desire to Be Ahead." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (4): 131-44. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.4.131JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- C71 Cooperative Games
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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