Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 6 No. 4 (Fall 1992)
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Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
Reny, Philip J. 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4): 103-118.
Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.
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Reny, Philip J. (U Western Ontario)
C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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