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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2008
  5. Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

  • Marco Battaglini
  • Rebecca B. Morton
  • Thomas R. Palfrey
American Economic Review
vol. 98, no. 2, May 2008
(pp. 194-200)
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Citation

Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca B. Morton, and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2008. "Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections." American Economic Review, 98 (2): 194-200. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.194

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief