This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 103 No. 2 (April 2013)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations

Article Citation

Name-Correa, Alvaro J., and Huseyin Yildirim. 2013. "A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations." American Economic Review, 103(2): 1091-1107.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.1091

Abstract

We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs. It is optimal for the fund-raiser to target only the "net contributors" -- donors who would give more than their solicitation costs. We show that as the income inequality increases, so does the level of the public good, despite a (potentially) non-monotonic fund-raising strategy. This implies that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and government grants often found in empirical studies.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Online Appendix (128.38 KB)

Authors

Name-Correa, Alvaro J. (Duke U)
Yildirim, Huseyin (Duke U)

JEL Classifications

D64: Altruism; Philanthropy
L31: Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us