Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 6,
no. 3, August 2014
(pp. 178-206)
Abstract
Following electricity market restructuring, approximately half of all commercial US nuclear power reactors were sold by price-regulated public utilities to independent power producers. At the time of the sales, some policymakers raised concerns that these corporations would ignore safety. Others claimed that the sales would bring improved reactor management, with positive effects on safety. Using data on various safety measures and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that safety improved following ownership transfers and the removal of price regulations. Generation increased, and this does not appear to have come at the cost of public safety.Citation
Hausman, Catherine. 2014. "Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (3): 178-206. DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.3.178Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D24 Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
- L51 Economics of Regulation
- L94 Electric Utilities
- L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
- Q42 Alternative Energy Sources
- Q48 Energy: Government Policy
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