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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 2 No. 4 (November 2010)

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Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade

Article Citation

Stefanadis, Christodoulos. 2010. "Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(4): 148-72.

DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.4.148

Abstract

In producer-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by productive agents and have strong property rights institutions—international trade causes an institutional improvement and an aggregate shift of talent towards production, and away from socially wasteful appropriation. However, in predator-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by rent seekers and have weak institutions—international trade leads to an institutional deterioration, and a more unfavorable talent allocation. (JEL D72, F12, K11)

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Authors

Stefanadis, Christodoulos (U Piraeus)

JEL Classifications

D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F12: Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
K11: Property Law

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