American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 6 No. 3 (August 2014)

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Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?

Article Citation

van der Weele, Joël J., Julija Kulisa, Michael Kosfeld, and Guido Friebel. 2014. "Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?" American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(3): 256-64.

DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.256

Abstract

We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.

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Authors

van der Weele, Joël J. (U Amsterdam)
Kulisa, Julija (Goethe U Frankfurt)
Kosfeld, Michael (Goethe U Frankfurt)
Friebel, Guido (Goethe U Frankfurt)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
D64: Altruism; Philanthropy
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification

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