American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics: Vol. 6 No. 3 (July 2014)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AEJ: Macro - All Issues

AEJ: Macro Forthcoming Articles

Public Communication and Information Acquisition

Article Citation

Chahrour, Ryan. 2014. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(3): 73-101.

DOI: 10.1257/mac.6.3.73

Abstract

This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other public actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and agents respond by choosing how many signals to observe. When agents desire coordination, the number of signals they acquire may decrease in the number released. The optimal quantity of communication is positive but does not maximize agents' acquisition of information. In contrast to a model without information choice, the authority always prefers to provide more precise signals.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Authors

Chahrour, Ryan (Boston College)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
E52: Monetary Policy
E58: Central Banks and Their Policies

Comments

View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment


American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AEJ: Macro - All Issues

AEJ: Macro - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us