Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 9,
no. 1, Winter 1995
(pp. 65-75)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This is an essay about the use of districting systems to regulate electoral outcomes and the evolution of party systems. By changing the number of seats from each district, a balance can be struck between the often conflicting goals of minority representation and defractionalization. Defractionalization is the process of forming broad-based governing majorities. Special attention is given to the electoral systems of Italy, Spain, and the United States. In the case of the United States, the author recommends a proportional representation system that mixes high-magnitude districts that encourage minority representation and low-magnitude districts that promote defractionalization.Citation
Rae, Douglas W. 1995. "Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 65-75. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.65JEL Classification
- D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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